CRISIS IN AFRICA AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

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BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CRISIS IN AFRICA AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1987

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER,
Washington, DC.

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mickey Leland, chairman, presiding.

Members present: Representatives Hall, Panetta, Dorgan, Penny, Flake, Bilbray, Mfume, and Roukema.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICKEY LELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Chairman LELAND. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, my distinguished colleagues also. I would like very much to thank our esteemed witnesses for being available to share their views on the continuing crisis in Africa and on what can be done to improve the U.S. Government's response to the crisis. All of us look forward to discussing these important matters with you.

It is fitting that the select committee's first international hearing of the 100th Congress is on the African crisis. From its inception, this committee has been engaged in efforts to ensure an adequate and appropriate response to the African famine and human suffering endured across the continent. I hope we have helped save the lives of many in Ethiopia, the Sudan, the Sahel, and in other regions devastated by drought. Today we face different challenges, however, in Africa. But our response can be no less vigilant and our determination no less certain. The people of Africa need our best efforts even more today, as the spotlight has faded, but the problems have deepened.

Africa has reached a critical juncture in its development. Most of the countries that were hardest hit by the recent famine have started to recover. The harvests have improved, food production has risen, and the relief camps have emptied. At the same time, many African nations have undertaken essential, and often painful, policy reforms, in order to encourage food production over the long term and to minimize economic inefficiency.

The United States must take advantage of this unique opportunity, if we are to assist Africa in making meaningful strides toward long-term development. Africa, even a recovering Africa, faces declining per capita food production, soaring population growth rates, severe environmental degradation and economic stagnation.

Our aid programs in Africa must address the critical needs of the poor majority, the essential role of women in development, and the

crucial necessity of protecting the environment. We also must maintain our economic commitment to the continent, not only through continued humanitarian aid, but also by finding ways to relieve the heavy debt burden that many of these nations carry.

As we work to improve our assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, we must pay special attention to the growing crisis in Southern Africa. The Republic of South Africa is engaged in a campaign of political, economic, and military destabilization against many of the states of the region. The citizens of the surrounding nations are being made to pay a high price as the illegitimate regime in Pretoria goes through its last, desperate contortions to preserve apartheid. This situation, in combination with developmental problems, continued drought and natural disasters, has resulted in declining health conditions, growing numbers of refugees, and chronic food shortages. Meeting the humanitarian needs of Southern Africa is as essential today as meeting the needs of the people of the entire sub-Sahara was 2 or 3 years ago, during the height of the famine.

I recently returned from Ethiopia and Kenya. This was my first trip to Ethiopia since I was there in 1984. I also visited Botswana and Angola earlier this year. The good news from those visits is that the drought has been broken, the rains have returned and the fields are green. I saw that there is much room for hope in Africa, but also much to be done.

For these reasons, I have introduced H.R. 776, the Southern Africa Humanitarian Initiative. I cannot imagine a higher priority than finding ways to help the people of the sub-Sahara to help themselves.

Let me ask my colleague if he has an opening statement, or any comment that he'd like to make.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement. I'd like for it to be part of the record, without objection. And I just appreciate the chance to be here on your initiative, and certainly Mr. Wolpe's initiative. I commend your compassion, your concern, your ability to stick with a very, very important issue that won't go away.

And as the news media stops focusing on famine and drought and their consequences and the infection and all the things that go along with what's been going on in various parts of Africa, we need to continue to stick with it. That's what this committee is all about. That's what your committee hearings and the bills that you've introduced are all about. I'm just glad to be part of it.

I'm sure this will be a very, very good hearing and I look forward to it and some of the questions that will follow.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 42.]

Chairman LELAND. Let me say to the gentleman from Ohio that his office has been invaluable, and because of his vision and work, particularly in Africa, during the famine, we have gone a long way. And I must say that the gentleman has contributed significantly to the work that needs to be done for long-term development aid in

Africa, and has set an incredible precedent, and has begun to build a foundation as chairman of the International Task Force of this select committee. And I'm very proud to be associated with the gentleman.

If there are no more questions or comments from my colleagues who we hope will arrive fairly soon, I'd like very much to proceed with the introduction of our four witnesses, and of course, we have with us Howard Wolpe, who is a very special friend as well as a valued colleague.

He is well known to the Select Committee on Hunger for his work. We've held joint hearings together. We have traveled together. We have worked hard together to terminate some of the very serious crises in Africa.

Through his leadership on the Subcommittee on Africa, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Howard has brought sensitivity and intelligence to the American Government's relations with African countries—elements which are frequently missing, I must say.

Congressman Wolpe fought to ensure an appropriate U.S. Government response to the terrible African famine of 1984 through 1986. Now he has introduced legislation to ensure a more sound and more adequate development assistance program for the continent over the next 5 years.

We're anxious to hear, Howard, your views on what the U.S. Government needs to be doing about the ongoing crisis in Africa, a crisis which continues to threaten millions of people with declining standards of living.

Let me thank you for being here with us and for your efforts on this front.

Let me also acknowledge the fact that the gentleman from Ohio and myself are very proud of the fact that you have done so much work in this area, but more specially because you too, are a classmate. We all came to Congress together and as a team we have been able to do some very good things.

Let me now have you make your testimony in whatever manner you wish to proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD WOLPE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Hall. I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before your committee. And I really want to begin by expressing my personal appreciation, to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the work of your committee.

I don't think there is any institution within this body that has done more to galvanize the intention our colleagues in the Congress and of our country to the problem of hunger, both here in the United States and across the world, particularly the African continent.

You have made two points repeatedly in the course of your leadership on this issue. One of them is that there is real human dimension that often gets lost in the statistics, reported in a rather stark fashion in our media. And I think you and the work of your committee have helped to bring home the human cost of this total

starvation that has been felt on the African continent, and here at home as well.

And the second point that you have made repeatedly is that we need desperately to move from crisis response to prevention—that really is the thrust of the legislation that you and other colleagues have joined in cosponsoring—H.R. 1199, the African Famine Recovery and Development Act.

This bill is essentially an effort to move American policy from a focus upon relief to a focus upon development, and to shift our policy toward one of assisting African states to move from dependency to self-sufficiency.

Americans are convinced that we need a foreign policy which actively and creatively protects our national interests around the globe. They also believe that much of our foreign aid is wasteful and inefficient, and that assistance often does not reach the people for whom it is intended.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, I've sponsored a year-long examination of our foreign aid program in Africa. That examination has included workshops with both African and American experts, a variety of public hearings, discussions with a bipartisan group of congressional staff, members of interest groups, and officials of the administration.

H.R. 1199, which was introduced Tuesday on the House side along with my Republican colleagues Ben Gilman, Claudine Schneider, and you, Mr. Chairman, and a number of other of our colleagues, who have been deeply involved in American policy toward Africa. A similar bill is being introduced in the Senate by Paul Simon, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, as the result of our deliberations.

No region in the world finds itself in such a steep and steady economic decline, as Africa. Africa's crisis of development seriously jeopardizes a range of American interests, involving economic, including potential markets for trade and investment, political, illustrated by growing political turmoil and exterior intervention, and our more open humanitarian interests in alleviating the hunger and misery that have characterized the lives of so many Africans within the last several years.

Yet billions of dollars in U.S. and Western aid have failed to make a lasting improvement in Africa's standard of living, a fact illustrated by Africa's continuing and tragic vulnerability to drought and famine.

Too often our aid programs have been poorly planned and ineffective, because we failed to involve African farmers and women and local people, generally, in the design of the systems.

For example, a road building program in Liberia not long ago turned out to have benefitted absentee landlords, rather than the small local farmers in the region.

Too often our aid projects have failed to enlist Africans' own contributions by ignoring the thousands of private and voluntary organizations, church groups, women's groups, local savings clubs, credit unions, cooperatives, that keep Africa going and mobilize citizen pressure to make African governments more responsive to development needs.

Top down, bureaucratic Western aid projects simply do not work. And the landscape of Africa is littered with resulting white elephants.

Too often our assistance programs have ignored African women, who produce 80 percent of the continent's food. Too often, we have not really insisted that African countries undertake policy reforms to improve incentives for production, such as correcting overvalued exchange rates, reducing Government budget deficits, raising real prices of food crops, and reforming or privatizing state enterprises.

At the same time we have failed to recognize that when policy reforms are undertaken, it is also necessary to protect the most vulnerable groups whose survival might be jeopardized by severe budget cuts, as well as safeguard long-term environmental interests.

Too often our aid programs have given short shrift to the need to protect the natural resource base of Africa so that environmental degradation does not undermine agricultural productivity. Nor have our efforts in the areas of health and population planning been adequate to sustain the human resource base for African development.

Too often our assistance programs have been hampered by atrocious management policies imposed by both the administration and the Congress.

Our aid dollars generate local currencies that can be used to increase our development resources. But we have too little idea of what happens to these currencies. Our aid is authorized on a short-term, 1 year basis, so we do not embark upon long return programs to develop Africans' own capacity to help themselves.

Our aid personnel spend too much time on paperwork and too little time on monitoring projects in the field and talking to grass roots people.

Too often, our aid policies are contradictory. We offer assistance on the one hand, and we ask bankrupt, poor African countries to keep paying us debts owed in past aid with the other aid.

The legislation which we have introduced, and which is supported by a wide range of citizen groups, including Interaction, which represents 114 U.S. private and voluntary organizations, as well as major environmentalist organizations, such as Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation, and National Audubon Society. H.R. 1199, represents a major step toward a more cost effective assistance program for Africa.

U.S. economic, political, and humanitarian interests require a sound and long-term aid policy for Africa as an alternative to the extensive bandaid of famine relief.

I'm not going to detail the features of the legislation which were described just this week in an earlier press conference, and which are contained in the full text of my testimony.

In closing, I would like to say just a few words about A.I.D.'s informal reaction to our bill.

In the first place, I'm very heartened by their acknowledgment of the problems and the considerable agreement between us about what needs to be done to increase the effectiveness of U.S. assistance in Africa.

I have spoken directly to Mr. McPherson on several occasions. I'm impressed by his willingness to work with us to achieve mutually satisfactory legislation.

One of A.I.D.'s strongest concerns about H.R. 1199 is that it earmarks 30 percent of appropriated funds, 10 percent each, for natural resources, health, and voluntary family planning. That leaves the remaining 70 percent to be spent by A.I.D. flexibly within certain broad authorities. A.I.D. would like 100 percent, rather than 70 percent, flexibility. And that's perfectly understandable from an administrative point of view.

But, we have inserted these earmarks on policy grounds because A.I.D. simply has not been doing enough in the areas of natural resources and health and voluntary family planning in Africa, despite considerable urging from Congress.

I would also make the point here that under current legislation, which is all allocated and appropriated on the basis of functional categories, A.I.D. has virtually zero discretion in the allocation of those funds. There is currently less administrative flexibility than we are envisaging under the African initiative.

Therefore, I think our legislation really goes in a direction that A.I.D. would like to see the Agency move on a worldwide basis. It is my hope that the model being developed re-structure African development assistance programs might also be applicable to other parts of the world.

The recent famine alerted the world to the fact of the undermining of the natural resource base in Africa—the degradation, desertification, and deforestation, that seriously affected agricultural productivity. The U.S. Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that unchecked soil erosion could reduce land productivity in Africa by 25 percent between 1975 and the year 2000.

According to UNICEF, the desertification rates are increasing in 19 African countries. The World Bank says forest land is shrinking at a rate between five-tenths of 1 percent to 1.4 percent annually. Successful small-scale projects, such as CARE's project in Zaire, which protects the soil from erosion, hold much promise in restoring the resource base. More such projects are needed.

Similarly, there is a need for greater emphasis upon rural based primary health care and voluntary family planning. Beyond humanitarian concerns, sick people cannot contribute very much to economic growth. Infant mortality rates in Africa are the world's highest. An average of 150 out of every 1,000 children die in Africa before their first birthday.

Eighty percent of disease in the developing world is related to poor water and sanitation. Currently, 90 percent of Africans are without piped water.

Africa has the world's highest population growth rate at 3.1 percent. On the other hand they have a relatively low use of contraceptives, about 3 to 4 percent across the continent. In areas where contraceptives are widely available, use is 25 percent and higher.

Clearly, development prospects will be dim unless greater domestic and external support is given to health and voluntary family planning.

Impressed by Africa's growing commitment to these areas, the World Bank has just announced that it plans to double its money

for population and related health programs over the next 3 years, and has appealed for more aid from all donors.

This legislation ensures that there will be a meaningful American response. As I previously mentioned, under current law, development assistance is channeled through the so-called functional accounts, and is, therefore, virtually 100 percent earmarked for specific sectors. Under our bill, only a total of 30 percent would be earmarked, and that would be for three crucial areas of activity.

Finally, I have a sense that A.I.D. would like our bill to say even more than it does about the need for a favorable policy environment and the importance of fostering private initiative in Africa.

Actually, these are mentioned repeatedly throughout the bill, particularly in the discussions of policy reforms, small farmers and private voluntary organizations.

In fact, much of what the PVO's do in Africa is for the benefit of small farmers and enterprises.

We would not, however, go so far as to say that the free market is the only solution for Africa's problems. We don't even believe that here in the United States. Next to the private sector, experts agree that public research and roads and clinics and schools and even in some cases efficient agricultural projects such as in Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Kenya, may be effective ways of assuring economic growth with equity and environmental sustainability.

We agree with A.I.D. that private markets have been discouraged, but we see the exact private sector, public sector balance as a problem to be determined by the actual results of policies. We also see that as something that will be variable from country to country. And in supporting policy reform to encourage increased productivity, we agree with the World Bank and UNICEF that we need adjustment of the human face, to use their phrase—adjustment that does not jeopardize the very survival of the poor or long-term environmental interests.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It has really been a joy to work with you all these many months in trying to mobilize the response that is now contained within this legislation.

I emphasize that a lot of people have been involved in this effort for a lot of months, and I'm very proud of the product and I look forward to its adoption by the Congress this session.

Chairman LELAND. Before I ask any questions of our witness, let me yield to the gentlelady from New Jersey for any comments or any questions that she might have at this time.

I realize that we are imposing on her, as she has just arrived.

Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, you're very kind. I apologize for not being here promptly, but I have reviewed the testimony and appreciate Mr. McPherson's contribution. I am most anxious to hear from him. I have no questions.

Chairman LELAND. Howard, I've got a couple of questions that I'd like to ask you.

You and I have traveled together in Africa, and in particular Ethiopia where there are some very difficult political problems.

To what extent do those political problems exacerbate our efforts in Congress to get more aid, not only to the continent in general,

but more specifically, to those countries where we have political problems, problems of ideological differences?

Mr. WOLPE. There is no question that the policy differences that we have with some countries in Africa have certainly compromised our ability to mobilize political support within the Congress, and among the American people, in some cases.

In some instances, the governments themselves have made our job more difficult. When we have had serious human rights violations occur, for example, in Ethiopia in some of the resettlement efforts a couple of years ago, that affects opinion in this country. Many of us participated in discussions with the leadership of the Ethiopian government trying to impress upon them that the human rights violations and the brutality that was evidenced, is jeopardizing the entire international relief effort.

I think we were successful in making the case to the extent that much of that resettlement coercion has apparently been suspended. Now there are international relief officials from the United Nations and from other countries actually in the resettlement camps themselves, so that there is much more of an open view of what is happenning.

So I think that is one instance in which we have to fight a lot of different battles on the House floor to keep the focus on the people, as distinct from the government.

We've always argued in this country that starving children know no politics and that is important to recognize that we do not want our sense of anger and concern with respect to the policies of a government to get in the way of our effective response in keeping people alive.

We have other instances of course where civil war and conflict are, in a logistical sense, making very difficult the effective provision of relief supplies. Right now in Mozambique, you have a situation in which continuing South African support of insurgent activities is devastating the countryside, making very difficult the ability of the government to move relief to development.

Farmers want to plant, they want to proceed with the harvest. Those activities are undermined constantly.

In Angola, the continuing civil war is devastating the country and making so much more difficult the challenge of development for the Angolan people, and of course in this country, the issue of Government policy is also a matter of deep division within the Congress.

The consequence of our policies sometimes is not what we intend. We don't always fully understand the human reality of what's taking place in these countries. I think sometimes we end up escalating the militarization of conflict in these countries at enormous human cost. The peasants, the children, really just don't want to be part of the war. They just want to survive.

I wish there were some way that we could make more real the human dimension and consequence of policies that we sometimes pursue—the intent is not often realized in fact.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you, Howard. Your bill calls for a much greater focus on the poor majority, and the essential role of the environment in U.S. Government assistance, as you stated in your testimony.

Do you believe that we can effectively legislate essential changes such as these in A.I.D.'s policies?

Mr. WOLPE. I think so, as long as there is effective oversight. What we've done in this bill is two things. One is we've changed the mandate in some respects. We're trying to give emphasis to those areas of policy that we think have been neglected. We took a broad range of testimony from, as I said earlier, both African and American development experts. There were certain themes that constantly flowed through our testimony, such as the failure of development policies of the past to involve the people who are being most affected by those projects and activities. The consequence is that so much of what we have done is not sustainable, or sometimes is simply inappropriate to the needs and circumstances of the region of the country.

That is a major thrust of the legislation, to enable a much greater degree of involvement and consultation with people in indigenous communities and organizations. There are other kinds of emphases that I previously described such as the allocation of funds and the importance of women in development activities in these societies. At present women are very under-represented in development assistance activities.

It is not enough simply to lay out the mandate and the emphasis. The second part of that is to try to establish more effective means of oversight. We've done that we think, by eliminating some of the paperwork requirements that hinder achievement of A.I.D.'s goals.

There's so much paper that comes through here. Some of the congressional presentations look great, they're glossy, but they give us no real measure as to whether identifiable goals are being achieved. We're trying to eliminate the unnecessary paper work requirements, and trying to restructure the reporting process. We've tried to frame the reporting in terms of the achievement of identifiable goals that we lay out in legislation.

We think it will give the committees of oversight a much more effective means of monitoring what is happenning and assessing what we're doing. Oversight is indispensable to this effort, as is the policy mandate itself.

Chairman LELAND. Very good. The gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. Penny.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Howard, we hear a lot about the inability for us to ship more food aid to these areas because of logistical problems. And that always frustrates me because we're sitting around in this country with a lot more grain that we can handle. And I sometimes get the sense that we use these logistical problems as excuses rather than looking for ways around those problems.

What is your assessment of our ability to increase food aid shipments? How much more do you think we can actually manage in that regard?

Mr. WOLPE. At the moment, knock on wood, our levels of delivery are adequate to the emergency requirements of the continent. We are not still in the situation we were in some months ago with thousands of people dying in Ethiopia and Sudan. There are still two major problems in the continent with the emergency assistance. One is Sudan and the other is Mozambique. And there are

still many countries that are short of food. Without food imports, you would be back into a very bleak situation very quickly, even in Ethiopia. I'm not sure of the exact numbers right now but a very substantial percentage of Ethiopia's food requirements are still being met by imports.

At least the delivery system is adequate to the immediate task. What has happened in the past, however, is that when there suddenly has been an emergency requirement, we have not allocated the kinds of funding for the transportation of what was required. That was demonstrably clear in the Ethiopian case where there were relief goods just piling up at the port. There were not enough trucks nor aircraft to carry supplies into the interior. It was enormously frustrating to all the parties involved, both the Ethiopians and the donor countries themselves.

Likewise in the Sudan there were some very, very significant shortages of appropriate trucks and vehicles to carry the supplies.

The road systems in many of these countries are so inadequate that even when they do exist, the trucks that run on them must be constantly overhauled; and there's usually a tremendous shortage of spare parts, and of ability to effect the kind of maintenance that's required.

I think that in the past we have been too inattentive to that aspect of the total relief effort that's required in an emergency situation.

Now, the broader question that you raise is not so much a question of technical issues as it is of distribution. There is surplus food worldwide, and we have surpluses of food in the United States. We still have hungry people here in America. There is, in fact, a distributional problem that is really staggering.

The situation of having the abundant food surpluses we have in this country and still have even in our own country people who don't have adequate nutrition, is something we all need to struggle with in trying to remedy. That's not so much a technical problem of the absence of trucks or delivery vehicles, but it's much more a policy problem in the way our programs work.

Mr. PENNY. Are we—you mentioned PVO's in your testimony. Are we using them enough, are we trying to do it through governmental delivery in instances where maybe the PVO's would do a better job?

Mr. WOLPE. I think we have been making very extensive use of the PVO's. Were it not for the PVO's, the work that has been done both in emergency relief and even development assistance would be far less successful and far less extensive. The PVO's have been indispensable, and for years and years the American Government has channeled a good part of our aid through PVO's as well as through governments themselves.

I think there is a lot of evidence that it's the work of the PVO's that's been most effective in development. The PVO's often have much closer links to village communities, and sometimes more credibility, than the governments themselves.

Thus, PVO's are a critical resource for this effort. What we try to do in this legislation is to make even more emphatic the importance of utilizing that vehicle for development programs.

Mr. PENNY. How about the follow-through, once the emergency is past, and what about other development activities, either hand in hand with emergency assistance, and then of course the follow-through of those related activities, once the emergency has passed?

Mr. WOLPE. Historically, not only we, but the entire international community and the African states themselves, tend to be motivated by crisis. It's much easier to mobilize national support when people are seen to be starving and immediately at risk of death, than it is to mobilize that kind of response in advance of the crisis. The most effective way to conserve not only lives but money, is to get self-sustaining development underway. That paradox is a constant frustration.

Basically, what this legislation attempts to do is to mobilize much greater emphasis on prevention and to move us away from the necessity of responding to the crises that result when you don't have sound development taking place.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Flake. Mr. Mfume.

Mr. MFUME. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Bilbray.

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I don't know if this is working or not.

Mr. Wolpe, I apologize for being late, but Foreign Affairs is meeting upstairs, and we're both members of that committee.

Mr. WOLPE. I'm a little bit late there, too.

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes, they schedule three subcommittees at the same time and you're on all three. So I'm sorry I'm late. But I presume that our Subcommittee on Africa will be handling the same problem, so most of the testimony you gave I will be hearing again very shortly.

Mr. WOLPE. That's right. We're going to be having three hearings in the next 2 weeks, with both Administration and private witnesses, on the subject of the legislation.

Mr. BILBRAY. The only question I have is again on Mozambique, some of the criticism I've heard again was about the regime in Mozambique being a Marxist regime and hostile to the United States in past actions. But has that changed the foreign policy of that country?

Mr. WOLPE. Well, one of the difficulties is that we Americans don't have much contact with the realities of many countries in Africa, and we end up being responsive far more to labels than to realities.

To the Reagan administration's credit, Mozambique is one instance that they have been able to get beyond the label. The government does call itself Marxist. The government has had a historic relationship, since independence, with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, there is probably no government in Africa that has been more self-critical, about its early ideological approach to the economy. The Portuguese left an absolutely devastated economy—they had an absolutely unprepared population to administer the machinery of a modern nation state.

Not knowing who to turn to at that point, the state felt that there were only a few people who had Western education and some of the skills that were required, and they thought they had better

try to do it themselves. They tried to take over a lot of enterprises at the state level. They didn't have the skills or the economic wherewithal to make those succeed. They tried initially in the early days to do some collectivization experiments that were a total disaster.

In the last several years the regime moved to change those policies, to change their ideological, doctrinaire approach to the economy, and to adopt a lot of the policy reforms and directions that the United States and the Western economies had been recommending.

It's not widely known in this country, but President Machel before, and President Chissano now, actually turn to Europe far more than the Soviet Union, for much of the economic, technical, and even military support. It is receiving a substantial amount of military support from European countries, and last year the Reagan administration recommended the provision of economic and security assistance to Mozambique.

Unfortunately, the Congress, responding to the Communist label, not recognizing that we have a tremendous opportunity in this instance to wean Mozambique away from the Soviet Union, and to work with a country that has really responded to almost everything we have asked of it, instead chose to limit in some respects the economic assistance and to reject entirely the security assistance that had been requested.

The Reagan administration is continuing its effort in saying that Mozambique is critical not only in and of itself to American national interests, but also is critical as part of a group of nations within Southern Africa that are involved in an effort to develop a regional economy and to reduce the dependency of all the states and nations in South Africa.

Mozambican ports are the natural points of entry and exit for Southern African goods that now must transit almost exclusively through South Africa. So the ability of the rest of the countries in the region, to prosper and to become more self-sufficient, depends in part upon Mozambique's economic success.

I hope that the administration's recommendation this year for continued support of Mozambique's efforts will receive an affirmative response in the Congress.

Mozambique is a classic case of where a response to the label misleads the reality of what is in fact happening in that country. If you sit down with Mozambican leaders, you will not find a more self-critical group of people. Almost to a fault, they will just lay out their understanding of mistakes they've made, their desire to move in a very different direction, toward the West, toward more pragmatic economic policies.

In 1984 Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati accord, a mutual nonaggression pact. In that agreement, Mozambique agreed not to permit any ANC operations or military activities on its soil. In exchange, South Africa agreed not to aid or support RENAMO guerilla activities against Mozambique.

It's an agreement the Mozambican's have honored, the South African's have not. And South Africa continues to launch aggression against Mozambique both directly and indirectly through a support of RENAMO. I would submit that those attacks by South

Africa, and the support of RENAMO by South Africa, is really an attack on American interests as well.

Mr. BILBRAY. Good answer.

Chairman LELAND. If I might add to the question, don't you think that the same scenario would develop if we were to work more constructively with Angola and Ethiopia?

Mr. WOLPE. I've said in the past, it will come as no surprise to anyone, that in many respects, the policy we are pursuing in Angola right now could have been drafted by the Soviet Union. I cannot think of anything more ludicrous than the proposition that we ought to be encouraging dependence by the Angolan government on the Cubans and on the Soviets, because that is the consequence of our policy.

The Angolan government, again, calls itself Marxist, and in fact it has been a bit more closed than the Mozambicans, in the way it has operated as a government.

It has also been enormously pragmatic. There are 100 American companies that operate there. That Government, when it set out to negotiate its contract with American oil companies, hired as its principal economic consultant, Arthur D. Little of Boston, MA.

We have had American businesses testify that there is no government in the continent with which they've had a more successful businesslike relationship.

In the early years of the Reagan administration, that was recognized. It's not widely known that the Reagan administration actually supported American investment in Angola, in the same fashion as earlier the Carter administration did. Then because of U.S. domestic policy, and the support of the right wing in this country for the so-called freedom fighter notion in which they were going to support Mr. Savimbi. Mr. Savimbi happens to have gone to the Soviet Union for support—he is an absolutely brilliant, charismatic leader who also happens to be, shall we say, very flexible in his ideological commitments depending upon the source of funding at the moment. Because of all that, we have now given our support to Jonas Savimbi, and undermined our credibility and undermined the progress the Reagan administration had been making in developing a relationship with the Angolan government, that I think in the end might have produced the elimination of the Cuban troops and could have produced a settlement in Libya. And that's really sad, because I'd like to see those objectives achieved.

But again, we have an instance of a government that has clearly, notwithstanding its affiliation with Marxism and its relationship with the Soviet Union, done all sorts of things to indicate a desire for a closer relationship with the United States. This is a government that wants American private investment and is prepared to protect that private investment. This government is prepared to adopt a very pragmatic approach to its own economy and has pursued an independent course in foreign policy—at times independent of Soviet Union initiatives.

And yet, we're the only major country in the world that refuses to recognize Angola. All of our European allies recognize Angola. Virtually every African country but South Africa recognizes Angola. And now we are engaged in a de facto military alliance with South Africa against the Angolan government.

South Africa is viewed by all the nations of Africa as the principal source of instability and aggression in the region. And why we want to be identified with South Africa and that kind of policy is beyond me.

The United States made major gains in terms of our credibility and our influence in Southern Africa by both the decision of the Congress to impose limited economic sanctions over the President's veto and by the Reagan administration's decision to open a dialog with ANC. But those two efforts have been contradicted by our continued support of the covert operation in Angola. It is estimated 18 to 20,000 amputations have occurred in the last couple of years, as a consequence of land mines being set throughout the rural countryside. The disruption of agriculture and economic development in both Angola and Mozambique are among the saddest situations I've ever experienced.

Chairman LELAND. One of the greatest ironies that I find about Angola is the fact that while, in the past, we've conditionally formalized relations between us and Angola, we still want the Cuban troops to leave. Yet when I was in Cabinda and I saw the oil fields that you were alluding to, especially the Chevron-Gulf oil fields in Angola, the Cuban troops were guarding the oil fields trying to protect them from incursions of the South Africans. It's a major American business interest.

Mr. WOLPE. The other actually amazing thing about this situation is that Mr. Savimbi was in this country not long ago, publicly declaring that he would seek to blow up American business installations if they did not stop lobbying American Members of Congress on the issue of U.S.-Angolan policy. And we have heard two of our colleagues stand up on the House floor and support this individual who advocates destroying American interests. I don't understand it. I thought in the last few months some other developments have occurred which resemble the middle of a Robert Ludlum novel. But I can't think of a more fanciful or a more foolish scenario than that which we are developing right now in regard to our policy in Southern Africa.

Chairman LELAND. Howard, finally, let me say that on my recent trip to Angola, I visited the Bie province where I saw many of the amputees that you talked about, particularly the children, who had been victimized in the farms where they were either working or playing. It was a very sad human scenario that we've developed. We are participating in helping to blow up children and people in Angola. And it's sad that we have no relationship there to help to develop that country, to help to at least provide the kind of necessary essentials that these people need to avoid malnutrition and starvation.

But at any rate, let me say to you I truly appreciate the human value of your testimony and all that you've brought to this committee and the continued work that you do as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa as well as the joint work that you have committed to doing with us in these very critical efforts.

Thank you so much for coming.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. The next witness we have is of course our most distinguished A.I.D. Administrator, Peter McPherson.

Mr. McPherson has been before this committee many times as well as having met with me on several occasions, particularly during the African famine crisis.

Three years ago, as we all sought to fashion the required response to the African famine, we found Mr. McPherson most cooperative. And even though he represents a different party and a different body—the administration—we have, I think, worked very well together.

Today Mr. McPherson will share with us his agency's perspectives in addressing the crisis in development in Africa, and will also, I hope, respond to a few particular questions I'm sure we all have.

Peter, it's good to see you, and thank you so much for coming before us to give us your testimony.

STATEMENT OF M. PETER McPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT [A.I.D.], ACCOMPANIED BY RAY LOVE, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR ON AFRICA

Mr. MCPHERSON. Mr. Chairman, it is good to be here again. And you are absolutely right. The relationship we have had over the years, particularly as to the famine, has been outstanding, and we at A.I.D. and the administration appreciate the very nonpartisan approach that you and this committee have taken on those famine issues. And we thank you.

With me is Mr. Ray Love, who is the senior career person in the Africa Bureau and now the Acting Assistant Administrator of Africa; he has been there for several years, and is my key person really in so many ways regarding African issues. I thought that perhaps it would be helpful to have him here with me.

There is a very important point I'd like to make about Africa. And if I can have your attention on this particular matter, I suppose more than almost anything else today, let me make that.

I think you all have been given a chart that lays out the per capita food production in Africa over the years, entitled Cereal Production, 1961 to 1986. I think you all have that.

Chairman LELAND. We do have that.

Mr. MCPHERSON. At the far right side of that chart is what has happened the last couple of years—the reality is that cereal production this last year in Africa, overall, was 36 percent greater than 2 years ago.

What we see is in fact that some of what we're doing, at least in food production, is really paying off.

Now, there are a number of factors there that you have to separate out and they account for some of this. Weather has been good. But also very key by almost everybody's judgment is that our efforts to persuade Africans to allow farmers to get paid more have begun to really increase production. I have very recently visited Nigeria, Kenya, and Senegal. In all those countries in the early 1980's and earlier, in the 1970's, there was a strong orientation to keep food prices to the farmer very low, essentially almost below production costs. They did that because there was urban population and

political power. So all farmers did was produce for themselves in many cases.

We really have been in the forefront, along with the World Bank, in articulating this and in conditioning our assistance in many cases on allowing farmers to get more. We said stop discriminating against your poorest people. And it's paid off. It's really impressive. And I think that in terms of overall economic policy changes, which are occurring now and more of which are still needed, in terms of their alignment with the West, their interest in the West, and our shared ideas and hopes and aspirations—as opposed to where they were in many cases in the 1970's—we have, for America, for the West, an investment in Africa with enormous profit potential. We need to keep that, and this is the beginning, in my judgment.

In this country we often think of Africa as some sort of desolate, hopeless basket case. Well, that just isn't fair. In the last couple of years, particularly, things have begun to change.

That really goes to a broader point I'd like to make. A famous American said, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." I suggest that there are lots of problems here. This committee will continue to talk about them and work on them. And I hope you do that. Some of the ideas that you have produced in the past have been helpful and I know they will be in the future.

But I think that the Africa strategy which we have in place is fundamentally right, and we shouldn't jerk that strategy around. Development is a long-term effort. You need to stay the course on these things. We need to plug away. We need to keep going on this economic policy effort.

Let me talk about something else that's rather long term. We need to stay with agricultural research. It takes a long time to develop a new variety of soybean. In fact, Secretary Shultz, in Senegal a few weeks ago, committed us to a 20-year effort—of $1 billion in total—of agricultural research for Africa. This will be well beyond my tenure as Administrator. We've already done a lot in the last several years. We got the potato, for example, in Sudan with 150 percent increases over traditional years. We've got a number of other crops with significant increases in various parts of Africa. It's a long-term effort.

Responding to some of the things that Congressman Wolpe mentioned: I have wanted to have greater managerial flexibility. It's really difficult to run the program and have all the criss-crosses and directions whose effects often seem almost like gridlock.

I respect and understand the various initiatives and ideas that get translated into earmarks sometimes. But what I need from you people—who have an understanding and interest in Africa, in ways that virtually no other group in Congress does—is to have you give me that flexibility. We need to continue the sense of partnership and consultation.

Congressman Wolpe says that his bill is less earmarked than the one we currently have. Well, I respectfully submit that this just isn't true.

The administration will, in a day or two, formally propose an Africa Fund of $500 million that has no earmarks in it.

We of course will be submitting specific projects for that $500 million that we wish to do.

To the extent we change those projects, we'll have to come up with a congressional notification. So Congress will get a chance to consider any changes we want to make.

But we can change, in consultation with Congress. What Congressman Wolpe would propose to do is to earmark 30 percent of that $500 million. He says: "Well, wait a minute, Peter. Currently you have functional accounts that earmark all of that $500 million."

That really isn't the case. It's complicated, but let me run through it.

Currently, we have a Sahel account of $70 to $80 million a year that is not earmarked at all. The Sahel account is where we got the $500 million idea to begin with.

Also, we have folded ESF into our Africa Fund. ESF is not earmarked functionally and has not been in the past. This year, ESF for Africa in about $160 million. So virtually half of the $500 million in the past has not been earmarked.

Moreover, my functional accounts are functional accounts worldwide. In other words, if I'm supposed to spend so much on population, I can in theory spend that any place in the world. But the Wolpe bill would earmark me so much for population, so much for natural resources, and so much for health, all in Africa.

In short, gentlemen, this bill is more restrictive in some ways than my current structure, and moreover, I guess my even greater fear is that if I ever start having functional earmarks on a geographical basis, next year somebody will decide we have to do the same thing for Asia, and pretty soon gridlock will truly occur.

Now these are issues that I'm talking to Congressman Wolpe about. And I hope I can work them out.

You know what I believe we should be thinking about, and I've been working this over downtown as well as talking about it to my Canadian colleagues, too, intriguingly enough. In many ways, the Canadians think a lot as we do and we work very closely together.

I think that maybe what we ought to be saying is: "A.I.D., here are the goals in family planning, contraceptive usage, child mortality, and agricultural production." Three or four key goals that we've been working on. Here are the things that you need to have as your management by objective goals, if you will. And that's what Congress is going to look at, to see whether or not you've been successful.

Now, in fact, we are being successful at some of these, but we haven't formally laid them out to you. There's a big dispute within A.I.D. as to the problems with that. But we need to continue to talk about it.

But I sense from you and Congressman Wolpe and others, that somehow or other, we, the executive branch—really all of us, because we've worked together over the years and it's sort of a team effort here—are all working toward what are fundamentally the same goals.

You need to have some measuring stick against which you can say we're doing well or we're not doing well. You need that for your own confidence or lack thereof, because you don't spend full

time at this, and you need that also so you can defend what you've done to your constituents and to your colleagues.

I would like to talk more with you about that, and would like to say two things. One, I want to have as few hamstrings on me as I possibly can. And two, I really urge you to look at what we've been doing and to look at the results that we're beginning to have. I've been at this 6 years. And I can see that it's not just the disaster that we all did some significant work on. It's agricultural production, it's family planning. With that background, let me just talk a moment about what we have done, and where I think we're going.

I mentioned agricultural research, where there are improvements now. But we need that research program on a sustained basis. And I think the American university community is out there geared up to really support it. I've noticed that I better build a constituency for any idea I have, or otherwise the thing gets washed away—even when I'm here perhaps, but certainly after I'm gone.

So we've extensively involved the university community, and a year or so ago, under Ray Love's direction, an agricultural research strategy was put together in connection with the World Bank, to do a lot of things closely coordinated with the World Bank and other donors. And that strategy is in place.

To complement it, we have put together a strategy, in the process of finalizing it really, a strategy on a network of agricultural universities. Many of you or most of you have land grant institutions in your States. I happened to go to Michigan State. But there's a whole range of land grant institutions around this country that were founded on the idea of solving problems of agricultural research, extension and education.

We did that in India, and we did that in Brazil 20 years ago. And it's generally thought—and I'm a firm believer—that we need that same system in place in Africa. We've got a good school going in the Kenya area and some ideas in East Africa, and so forth.

Those are long-term efforts and we want the World Bank to put up money, by the way, to build the buildings. We figure we'll provide the technical assistance and the Bank ought to build the buildings, or the Japanese or somebody. That's what we're doing in agriculture.

In population, through all spigots last year, we put over $50 million into population and family planning in Africa. That's almost as much as the $60 million that would be earmarked under the Wolpe bill in any case. About $35 million incidentally came from the Science and Technology Central Fund, where we fund much of our population effort.

I know that those of you who know me realize how committed I am to the family planning area. It just is critical. It's really interesting. In the 6 years I've been watching this, I can see some real changes in family planning.

When I got here, I remember fairly early on, I told the person in the Cameroon that we have to have more family planning in Cameroon. He said: "Well, Mr. McPherson, last time I talked to my party in Congress"—this was several years ago again—"I got up and said in 20 years the population of this country is going to double." At this point I was going on to tell him about all the prob-

lems that was going to bring. "When I said it will double, this whole crowd stood up and cheered."

That sort of reaction in many parts of Africa is in contrast to the reactions today, where very systematically, you have leaders showing commitment, and we're beginning to get some real results.

There is no question that the Zimbabwe program, to which we were key, has the support of that government. Now Zimbabwe has a 40-percent contraceptive usage rate. In Kenya, which is widely cited as the worst problem, 4 plus percent population growth, we think by mid-1987 the contraceptive use in Kenya will be about 20 percent for child-bearing-age women.

That's up from almost nothing a decade ago. And we know that the population growth rate is now down to about 3.6 percent. That's not the problem solved, but I see the trends in a number of countries in Africa going up fairly substantially and I can tell you that there is nothing that I am more committed to than making sure that we get contraceptive availability out there.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. McPherson, might I interrupt just a second and ask you about the contraception?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Yes.

Mr. DORGAN. We are aware of the AIDS problem that exists in some parts of Africa in fairly serious proportions. Is that tying in to the increased use of contraceptives as well?

Mr. MCPHERSON. I think some. I visited Botswana a few weeks ago, and there's no question in the minds of my people there, based on public discussion and newspaper coverage of condoms being a possible protection, that AIDS had a direct impact upon condom sales in local drugstores.

But I think that in Kenya it's a more fundamental thing than just the AIDS business, because this is something that's growing.

Let me just close by saying that in the environmental area, we think we're doing a lot of things. We might well detail those, but environment is not just an issue of planting more trees. Environment is figuring out how you can increase agriculture production so people don't plant so much on marginal lands. It is the population issue. It's a whole number of other issues. There are more, but those are the sort of fundamental underlying issues that you have to tackle as well as looking at some specifically environmentally affected areas.

And we're doing some of that. For example, we think that the Guinea Highlands, which are the headwaters for several of the major rivers, are in danger of too much deforestation, to the great detriment of rivers in that part of the continent. And we're looking at what we can do about that.

I have for you an environmental policy paper for Africa which we really just have finished up. It has taken us some time to do because we've approached it very thoroughly, and you might want to take a look at that, as well as the recently finalized child survival action plan for Africa.

So to conclude, I would argue yes, there are always questions and problems, and that's what government is about. I hope you continue these questions that you ask, but I hope you also will look at the things that are in place and rolling. It's fundamental that we stick with it, because solving any development problem is a minimum of

a 10- and usually a 20-year business, and we're getting some successes. So help me, if you will, to have an Africa program with minimum restrictions in how I administer it, but with a clear understanding of what I'm going to do and of how we rebate in the general consultative process.

Gentlemen, it's good to be here.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. McPherson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McPherson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 43.]

Chairman LELAND. I'd first like to commend you for the recent decision to send $50 million in food aid and related assistance to Mozambique. According to the Mozambican government, 5.7 million people are affected by food shortages in the country, and the U.S. food contribution is essential to keep these people alive.

I also commend the Administration's decision to increase aid to Southern Africa over the next 5 years, as you've indicated.

However, under the administration's proposal, funds will only be made available for policy reform, transport, and trade. And this is where we get into the meat of the differences between Mr. Wolpe's approach and your approach.

Given the enormous and immediate humanitarian needs of the region, why has the administration not proposed any increased humanitarian assistance for the region—more for emergency health care, for displaced persons, or for disaster assistance?

Mr. MCPHERSON. We have an ongoing program there of $175 to $200 million a year that includes the whole range of activity, including food. Very substantial programs. What was proposed by the executive branch is that, over the next 18 months, we will put $93 million there that includes a fiscal year 1987 supplemental plus fiscal year 1988 moneys and that this will be a multiyear effort. What we propose to Congress in 1989 is something we haven't worked out, but we see it as a multiyear effort. And it is that $93 million in those multiyears, additional efforts over and above the $175 to $200 million, where we will focus on those three things.

Now, this supplemental additional request for Southern Africa of course does not include the $50 million that you mentioned for Mozambique, the food. We're working that food through our process. We already have substantial food there. But it doesn't include the most recent humanitarian food effort.

It doesn't include any possible health or additional effort that we might provide to Mozambique. There is now a team from A.I.D. in Mozambique looking over child survival and the health problems in relationship to the drought and famine situation there, and I expect to get their report in the next few days.

We're fully committed to the concept that a hungry child knows no politics, and we will continue to follow that concept.

Chairman LELAND. Does that, by the way, include Angola?

Mr. MCPHERSON. We provide some food—and other help—through UNICEF, to Angola. It was 10 to 12,000 tons this last year. It is difficult, as you know, to administer a food program there, but UNICEF has been the agent that we've used for several years.

Chairman LELAND. Is there any hope for any change in our policy toward Angola regarding U.S. food aid? Where it may be difficult to distribute food there through our sources, have we looked

at the opportunity of communicating with the government to facilitate the delivery of food?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Our feeling has been that UNICEF has probably been the best institution to use to communicate and the best to try to work it out, just as it is, in my judgment, a good idea to look to the U.N. to try to do some of this work in Mozambique.

You have noted that I called for a U.N. coordinator in Mozambique and I would look to the U.N. to do the same thing with all parties in Mozambique.

Chairman LELAND. We don't have the time this morning, but I certainly would like to spend more time talking about Angola, and the whole Southern African region, especially as the United States considers some of the countries in that region as unfriendly for whatever reason.

I just returned a few days ago from Ethiopia. Things are clearly much, much better there now than they were 2 or 3 years ago. But there is still a food emergency in Ethiopia, without question. I guess the basic question I have for you is, will A.I.D. continue to meet not less than one-third of the emergency food deficit for 1987? Now, I know that there is a difference between their estimate of the needs and our estimate of the needs. But at least minimally, are we committed to contributing one-third of what we estimate the needs to be?

Mr. MCPHERSON. We have some questions on this issue that I've gotten into in some depth; it is a matter that I expect to get into again in the next few weeks or months.

At this juncture, they have a very large amount, I think some 200,000 tons of food in the country. There are some 85,000 tons of food which other donors have committed, but that has not yet arrived. We have a regular program this year of 20,000 tons that we will be providing.

My question here really goes to being sure that the Mengistu doesn't take us. In December 1984, Mengistu had in his reserves $44 million. By December—excuse me—by November 1986, a little less than 23 months later, he had $339 million in reserves. What happened was he took the PVO money and the donor money that came in as hard currency, converted to local currency, the usual conversion process, and saved a lot of money.

Now, I feel strongly that we did the right thing, all of us. We took the position that a hungry child knows no politics, and we delivered. The President was very much for that. I remember President Reagan calling me up one day, and he said, "Pete, we want to do what we can do." And we did that.

Now, around Ethiopia, there are a lot of countries with excess food this year. Sudan has some excess food and Kenya has some excess food, that they'd like to sell. Now, Mengistu should go out and buy some food from his neighbors from the cash reserves that he built up. He really should do that and we need to call upon him and push him to do that.

He continues to work the donor community. I mean, thank goodness that we insisted that our food in large part not go through the government last year, because we'd have been embarrassed. We did deliver it with the PVO's, and that system did work. My donor colleagues are a little bit more uncomfortable than I am, because as

you know, most of the other donors put their food through the government. And some of it went to soldiers, and went to other places.

I think we have to be tough on this, but we have to watch it. I mean, we have to watch Ethiopia's food situation and see how it is in a few months, see how it is in a few weeks.

Chairman LELAND. I understand that. But while I was there I talked to also some of the PVO's there, both U.S. PVO's and PVO's from the other donor nations that were involved, as well as our officials there.

They have indicated that there is very definitely a severe need, and they were all hoping that minimally we would meet our commitment to provide one-third of the resources there.

Now, as you know, and I must say I admit, too, we cannot depend on Mr. Mengistu to do what needs to be done or what we would expect him to do for the people of Ethiopia. However, in spite of some of the things that we objected to, all of us met our commitment during the African famine crisis. And under your leadership, in spite of Mr. Mengistu's actions and the problems that we had with the government, we met the commitment to the people of Ethiopia, not to the government, because we insisted that we would deliver the necessary resources to the people.

And because we met that commitment, literally millions of people are alive today.

I think that the crisis is not over. The circumstances have not changed that much, except to the extent that there has been a good crop and the rains have come. Problems tend to be cyclical in Ethiopia, and there still are some 1.5 to 2 million people at risk.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Maybe we should get together—I think I hear you. I think the situation is not imminently dangerous. But I think it's a potential real problem. And I agree with you it must be tracked carefully. The same PVO's that argue now they need more food told me a year ago that they were desperately in need of food. The PVO's tell me they need a desperate amount of food, regardless what the situation—not all of them, but some of them, some of them particularly. And I have to use other barometers, as you know, and as you do.

That was too blanket on PVO's, but there's a couple of PVO's that are always saying——

Chairman LELAND. Them aside, them aside, we need——

Mr. MCPHERSON. Maybe the thing for us to do is to—one, we've got to watch the next few weeks, and I want to continue to talk to you about that. I've spent some time on this this morning and about a week ago, and we've had people out there, as you know.

Maybe we should initiate an effort to get these major donors together and tell Mengistu, all right, you've got hundreds of millions of dollars in reserves—and that, incidentally, is more than most African countries, substantially more. We, Chairman Mengistu, expect you to put up—if we're going to give you more food, you have to buy a bunch from these poorer places across your borders.

Chairman LELAND. By the way, it was not Mr. Mengistu or any representative of his government who asked us about this. It was the PVO's and our people over there who made this request.

So, I understand what you're saying.

Mr. MCPHERSON. But he has asked for this publicly. He has publicly been out front.

Chairman LELAND. I understand. I understand.

Mr. MCPHERSON. For a guy that is hesitant about foreign influence, he certainly is quick to ask for foreign food and money.

Chairman LELAND. "OK. I have other questions, but let me first yield to my colleagues who might have questions.

Mr. Mfume.

Mr. MFUME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McPherson, given as you know the importance of women in African food production, what efforts are underway now by your Agency to expand programming for women in the agricultural sector? And could you try to be as specific as possible?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Yes. I would like to do just that.

I feel strongly that you shouldn't have projects that are solely for women. I think that women are part of the economic system, and the economic system and programs we have should include—we should be sure that they include—women in what we otherwise do; we should not have separate women's efforts.

There are some places where we are talking about an education program; in Pakistan, where women hardly get educated, women don't get as much education as they should. There you can target programs, but generally I don't like to target effort. But you need to think through each one of your projects and say well, if you have an agricultural extension program, is it structured, are the type of people we've got working, does it work in such a fashion that you reach women? Women are the majority, maybe a very large majority of the farmers in Africa, and that's a good example.

Let me just read some things to you about what we're doing—the agricultural research strategy for Africa. The Africa agricultural research strategy I mentioned focuses on small farmer crops—maize, sorghum, millet, and casava—crops that we know from our research are predominantly grown by women. You can't develop a sorghum that only women can plant, of course, but you can say, what do most women do? And then you can address those issues.

And that to me is a very good example.

We're involving women in our farming systems research projects, being sure that they're involved. And we have these projects in Rwanda, Mali, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Gambia, and others.

In our training programs, we bring thousands of people here every year. We're making a point of being sure that women are participating, that they get a real portion of the training we offer.

Mr. MFUME. What kind of a portion? What do you call a real portion?

Mr. MCPHERSON. I think we've got about 40 percent of our regional programs. Now, 40 percent is not easy, because women don't get the qualifying education. So it's a hard thing to do. But we think we have to. Now, an interesting—interesting to me anyway—part of how we approach women's issues in Africa, is that we don't go in and say: "Look, you've got to be fair to women, because that's the moral thing to do" That's what we believe, but that isn't in our judgment the way to approach it.

What we say is, "Women are 50 percent of your population. They are 50 percent or more of some portions of your economy. And on

an economic basis, you can't afford not to educate women, not to train women, not to have the agricultural extension programs get out to them." And that sort of approach is much easier to talk to about, let's say, in a Moslem society where women's role historically has been less.

I think that what we absolutely don't want to do is what we did during the 1970's. This is a Republican and Democrat administration. During the 1970's we said: "OK, we'll have separate women projects." And those separate women's projects ended up to not have impact.

I remember when I went down to El Salvador early on in my tenure——

Mr. MFUME. Let me stop you before you get started. I'm really not concerned about creating a program. I'm talking about what are you doing to expand women's roles in existing programs.

Mr. MCPHERSON. I think we're doing a lot and those were examples that I gave, and I could give you a lot more. I feel this to be a very critical issue, and it's an issue in which I personally have intervened in a number of projects, because I think that we're in the development business, and 50 percent, as I say, of the population is women.

Mr. MFUME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCPHERSON. I can go on at length on this point, as you can tell.

Chairman LELAND. Mr. Panetta.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of your problems that I see is that in looking at the overall trends in the budget in terms of the last 3 or 4 years, that what's happening, and I think what's going to happen, is that foreign aid is going to continue to get a smaller portion of the overall budget, and that in that context, A.I.D. is going to wind up getting hit even more in that process. I mean, certainly that's the history of what I've seen so far.

And I guess the concern I have is that in dealing with any of these issues that we've discussed, I don't see how you're going to be able to do it without some increased assistance in terms of targeting these areas. And that's the bottom line. You can move people around all you want, but ultimately if you don't have the resources to pump into it, it's going to be tough to do.

And I guess the question I have is do you share that concern? Do you see that that's the trend and what do you do about it?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Well, it certainly has been the last couple years. And we need your help very badly just to keep this up.

Now, frankly, tight budgets the last few years have made us, like any institution that is under a financial gun, very conscious of our money.

I think that we spend our money today more carefully and better than we ever have because of this squeeze. We're looking for ways to get more leverage. We're in discussions right now with the National Service Organization, a membership club kind of organization, about how we might match money that they have or could raise from their members—they raise $2 and we give $1—in connection with child survival activities.

We're leveraging and matching with this donor or that donor. I'm tying in with the World Bank in a way that we never have. It's pretty innovative, I think. But it's hard, and we need this money.

Mr. PANETTA. Let me tell you where this leads, because I've seen it happen in other areas.

And I understand and sympathize with the argument that we ought not to earmark areas, because any administrator who's worth his salt always prefers to be able to use the money where the priorities are and be able to shift things around.

But as that overall pot diminishes more and more, the problem is that the tendency for those of us in the Congress is going to be to make sure that you're at least targeting the areas that are of primary concern, and so what I see happening is obvious. I mean what Wolpe is talking about is, I'm sympathetic to that, too, because the problem I see is that anytime you have a pot of money to share it's much easier for the administration to target, or any administration, to target a general pot of money. But when you start line iteming, when we start making very specific where these moneys are going, in just a categorical line-by-line sense, then we've got something to grab onto that says my God, you know, you can't stop these particular areas in terms of targeting funds. And that's the trend. I mean, I'm sympathetic with what Howard's talking about because he says, you know, environment, population, health, these are key areas, and we ought to be spending a decent amount there.

And the concern I have is that, from just a budget point of view and how people approach budgets, you look at the A.I.D. pot, it's there, it's not being targeted in terms of particular areas, it's an easy target in the foreign aid budget.

And I don't, I don't know how to deal with that, because frankly, I'm concerned that this is always going to be an easy target when it comes to lining up priorities in the massive budget.

And somehow you are going to have to sit down with Howard and decide some basics in terms of how much you're going to target in some of these areas, because in defending your budget, if I know that this percentage is going for this and this percentage is going for that, it increases my ability to deal with my colleagues and try to say protect their budget because 10 percent is going here, 10 percent is going here, we need those funds for that purpose.

It's very similar to the education budget. We have categorical funds that flow into migrant education, into handicapped education, or flow into this kind of education, and we can say don't cut because you're cutting the handicapped, you're cutting the poor, you're cutting the migrants. And to some extent I sense that we're going to have the same problem here, because we are looking at areas of need and yet when you wrap it all into some kind of general fund, it makes it tougher for us to stand up and defend the budget that you need. You need this. You need more than what you're getting. In 1985 where was it, $720 million, and now we're fighting over $500, $465, $500, $600 million. You need a lot more with the problems that you got.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Does it help any if I continue to say as I have been, "Look, here's how much I expect to spend on health, how much I expect to spend on population," and as far as I'm concerned, while those aren't statutorily mandated, they are basic

agreements of colleagues in an effort that I would be flexible about only at the margins.

And part of my concern for the earmark of Africa is that once you start there, then you go to Asia, then you go to Middle East, then you go to Latin America. That is the pattern that emerges. And I'd rather have sort of a gentlemen/ladies agreement as to how we were going to do things, with maybe some report language or something talking about it. That is really quite different than just nailing down numbers.

Chairman LELAND. If the gentleman will yield, Pete, I think the real problem we have here is that the front line states of Southern Africa that make up SADCC are the priority when it comes to Africa. Because of the attempts of South Africa to destabilize the countries in Southern Africa, I think that Howard is particularly concerned that the needs of these countries are met. Now, whether or not he is willing to compromise with you, I don't know, because he is very concerned about these countries, as are members of the Congressional Black Caucus.

I understand what you're saying and I look at it from a broader point of view than just Southern Africa, and more than Africa itself, because we have to look at the world.

But I think that the real concern that you need to hone in on is that the front line states are a particular concern right now, and we want very much to see that their needs are met at least minimally. If you can address that, I think that you might go a long ways in getting Howard to go along with you.

Mr. PANETTA. Let me just ask another area. Obviously the conflicts, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, one of the concerns that I would have is the security problems in terms of transportation of food and what's taking place. Are there problems that you're seeing, what's being done to try to——

Mr. MCPHERSON. Mozambique? Definitely. The logistical problems in Mozambique are quite substantial. We figure there are about 3.5 million people in areas that have maybe extra hard, but not extraordinary logistical problems.

Now, in contrast, there are 1 to 2 million people in areas where RENAMO is very active, and we're going to have problems getting the food around there. Now that in my judgment is one of the things I see this U.N. person helping us with—some of those issues and problems. There could be a million or so people there—the numbers aren't quite clear yet—who have problems.

Now, there's some food. The crops have been harvested, they've been planted and harvested recently. So this isn't necessarily a problem of massive proportions tomorrow morning. But it clearly is going to be the hardest part of the Mozambique situation.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you.

First of all, let me advise that the record will be open for further questions to be submitted to you, Mr. McPherson, for your responses, without objection.

The administration has already spent $52 million to help the earthquake victims in El Salvador. You alluded to El Salvador earlier.

A.I.D.'s own estimate of the total number of affected people there is 311,000. Now, you were requesting another $100 million in supplemental funding in disaster assistance for the earthquake.

At the same time, in Southern Africa we have several million people, millions of children actually facing a slow death from starvation and malnutrition.

Now, how can it be that we need all of this assistance for a relatively few people in El Salvador and not more relief or aid for the children of Southern Africa?

Mr. MCPHERSON. We're prepared to put a lot of food into Southern Africa. I don't see where circumstances are clear that food is necessary. We have responded, as we have in Mozambique, at this time.

I don't think that this is a question of El Salvador earthquake response or Southern Africa food. We both know that it's not just food that's necessary, but food is a big part of it.

The earthquake was a tremendously disruptive event in the society there. There are a lot of people who have needs, and I think we've invested a tremendous amount on the economic and military side in El Salvador——

Chairman LELAND. Too much in the military side, if I may say.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Yes. I know we might not necessarily agree on that, but I know you've been in support of the economic side of the assistance there. And we should, in my judgment, not back away from a critical problem at a time that things are well underway in El Salvador. In terms of the political situation——

Chairman LELAND. Now, don't get me wrong, Mr. McPherson, if I may interrupt you. I am not by any stretch of anybody's imagination saying that we ought to interrupt humanitarian aid, whatever it is, food or otherwise, to El Salvador. I don't think that we ought to play victims of earthquakes against victims of famine, by any means.

What I'm alluding to is the proportionality of how much we spend for 311,000 people versus how much money and how many of our resources we are going to commit to literally millions of people afflicted by the famine in Africa.

Mr. MCPHERSON. I think that the reality is, and I do support it, that our foreign aid program has multiple purposes.

We have humanitarian efforts, such as we've done so well in Africa with the famine and other places in the world. We have foreign policy interests. We have U.S. commercial interests. We have a lot of interests. And it is true that the earthquake money has a significant humanitarian cast to it, but it also is in my judgment important for the political stability of that society to have that money there.

And so we're not comparing, when we look at our foreign aid budget, we look at the multiple purposes for which it is spent.

Chairman LELAND. This committee, and let me speak only for the chairman at this moment——

Mr. MCPHERSON. I can tell you responded to my comment.

Chairman LELAND. Absolutely. I am concerned about the humanity of all people. I understand the foreign policy implications of our foreign assistance. But more than anything else, I am concerned

about the survival of those millions of children and other folks who are suffering in Africa as well as in El Salvador, first and foremost.

I think that the foreign policy interests that we have in El Salvador are ancillary to our efforts to aid the victims of the earthquake. And if you are saying to me that we should be spending disproportionately more money in El Salvador than in Africa, then we've got a real, fundamental difference in our efforts to help suffering people.

And I know that you have to speak for the administration. I don't question your particular concerns about humanity at all. But I'm dealing with you strictly now because you and I have had many conversations about people and their survival.

I question the administration's judgment in this matter, because, if I might divulge a confidence, the Chargé d'Affaires in Ethiopia wants $1 million in discretionary funds for him to spend on helping the orphans of the famine in Ethiopia. And we're going to have to beat up on the Budget Committee, and beat up on you. I think that you would like to see it happen, and I want to ask you to comment on that now.

I saw those kids in Ethiopia, who are fat now, and I was so happy, because they are so different than the kids I saw in 1984 who were emaciated from the famine. But many of these kids don't have beds to sleep in, many of them don't have shelter, they don't have blankets, and on and on.

But, if you're talking about foreign policy implications, there is a tremendous amount of good will that we can convey by way of our contributions just in $1 million, in particularly one region of the country, and that's in Gonder region, where there are indeed thousands of refugee children who are refugees only because they were orphaned by the famine.

I'm truly concerned about the disproportionality of giving $100 million in relief to El Salvador versus so little to the millions of people who are suffering in Africa.

Mr. McPherson. I think there are a number of places that are worth looking at. For example, I, for years, have thought that a Cyprus earmark was just entirely out of place. I mean, we've educated, we've built more places there—we don't need money for Cyprus. But Congress earmarks money for Cyprus. We don't need it politically, for foreign policy concerns; we don't need it from a humanitarian point of view. It is a domestic political earmark.

There are some questions as to how you might compose the Irish foreign aid program. We wanted to do $50 million with various guarantees and so forth. But Congress, and the esteemed Speaker of the House, said it had to be a full $50 million cash.

Chairman Leland. We've got another Irishman in the Speaker's seat now.

Mr. McPherson. You know, you've been very constructive, and we appreciate the kind of help that you've given, we really do. We've had a good time struggling with this. But there are so many places in this foreign aid program where—I mean, I hear your point.

Chairman Leland. Here is what we'll do. I've got the perfect solution.

Mr. McPherson. You and I need to divvy up this budget.

Chairman LELAND. How much money do we give to arms to the El Salvadoran army?

Mr. MCPHERSON. I don't know the figure. It's substantially less——

Chairman LELAND. Is it more than $100 million?

Mr. MCPHERSON. No, I don't think so.

Chairman LELAND. Is it about $100 million?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Maybe about $100 million.

Chairman LELAND. Why don't we take that $100 million, give it to the 311,000 people and then take the $100 million that we saved and spend that in Africa on the relief of those victims of the famine?

Mr. MCPHERSON. Well, I think that your comment is rhetorical.

Chairman LELAND. I swear to you that I would be the first to vote for that transfer of funds.

Mr. MCPHERSON. Well, there are lot of issues this morning, our allocations, our earmarks—there are a lot of issues in our foreign aid budget that reflect history, some of which is remarkably outdated, that reflect domestic political concerns. Some of my comments in that regard you and I would agree upon and others we wouldn't.

But the reality is that we have today a crisis of sorts, and a pending, much greater crisis in terms of funding for things that are important for America—absolutely among those, the humanitarian interests of this country. And we don't necessarily go through a rational process in this foreign assistance budget.

We spend, on the economic side, almost $7 billion a year. That's quite a lot of money. If we could spend it in a rational way, we could probably do much more.

Let's talk more about this issue. It's a complicated one and a touchy one.

Chairman LELAND. As a matter of fact, if you will recall, I requested a meeting with you. You granted a meeting with me prior to this hearing, but that was not the kind of meeting that I wanted with you, so I asked my staff to postpone our meeting, because I needed to spend more time discussing with you these matters. Peter, maybe what you and I need to do is to get together, go to Africa, go to Southern Africa in particular, and go to Angola and go spend some time talking to Chairman Mengistu himself.

Mr. MCPHERSON. He's never granted me an interview.

Chairman LELAND. Well, I will tell you that on this visit, I spent 2½ hours with Chairman Mengistu discussing with him a broad spectrum of issues and at the end of the meeting, he invited me and my delegation to have a private dinner with him which has never been done in the history of his administration in Ethiopia.

We were the first Americans to have such a meeting. And I included purposely our Chargé, and he had the advantage of sitting there for the first time as an American official with Chairman Mengistu. I might add we heard some disgruntlement on the part of the Soviets. They did not want to see that happen, and the message got out all over the country that indeed we had those meetings.

And I am happy to report that I'm sure that the Soviets are upset, but the chairman in his words suggested that they have to

understand that Ethiopia is an independent, sovereign nation which will take no dictates from anyone.

I think that that in itself was a clear signal that the chairman wished to make overtures again to us, about normalization of relations among other things.

But I can't imagine that if you and I traveled together to Ethiopia, that the chairman would deny you an opportunity to address your concerns about the problems that you have, not only with the government but also with the distribution of supplies and with the money that you talked about that Chairman Mengistu has in reserve.

We should not only travel to Ethiopia, but also to some of the friendlier countries, like Kenya, even though there's a political problem there now, as well as Botswana and other places where you have been——

Mr. McPHERSON. Well, let's think about that.

Chairman LELAND. Let me raise one very difficult issue.

There is a policy that you have where A.I.D. uses South African owned or controlled vessels in the transportation of food. Is that not correct?

Mr. McPHERSON. Our policy does not preclude their use. To the best of the records that we have been able to search, we have not used a South African vessel for a couple of years. One was used during the famine period. I tried to determine whether or not it would have been practical to use anything else. It was argued that it was an important vessel to be able to use to get food from one place to another at that point in time.

We know, of course, under the sanctions legislation it is not possible to use state owned vessels. That is precluded under the sanctions provisions. But the current rules don't preclude the use of private South African vessels—and as I say, if I found it critical from a point of view of getting food to a certain place, I would not want that to be precluded. In my mind, it isn't a problem at this juncture.

Chairman LELAND. I appreciate your candid response. I just introduced legislation that would prohibit A.I.D. or anyone else from using South African vessels to transport food. And for obvious reasons. Because in the spirit of the sanctions legislation, we ought not to reward the South Africans, because this is not a charitable overture on the part of the South African Government for us to use their vessels. This is a very definite financial venture for them. And in the spirit of the sanctions legislation, I think that we ought not to allow for these folks to profit from the suffering of people in Africa when they are victimizing so many other millions of people in their own country. What I'd like to work out with you is that if it was clearly the policy of A.I.D. to preclude the usage of South African vessels, I would not pursue the legislation.

Mr. McPHERSON. I don't think, at least at this time, that that has not been a policy of ours. It just is the reality that South African vessels haven't won the contractual bids, except for that one time some time ago.

We don't see it as an operational issue. You get the other concern of course, we always go out and try to find the cheapest ship-

ping we can find. Well, we're happy to pursue it with you, but that's our position——

Chairman LELAND. Let's put that on our agenda, because that is a concern not only of mine but also of particular Members of the Congressional Black Caucus and as you know we pursue this whole issue of apartheid with great passion and fervor. And I would rather deal with other interests than just this particular issue if in fact we can pursue it in another way.

Thank you, thank your colleague, and all of your folks. Let me say that I had a chance to meet with some of the A.I.D. folks not only in Ethiopia but also in Rome and some of your——

Mr. MCPHERSON. I hope you get to know my colleague, Ray Love here——

Chairman LELAND. Well, I'm sorry he didn't get to talk. You and I were so talkative he didn't get a chance to say anything. But next time we'll invite him. I'd love to meet him. As a matter of fact, at our meeting that we have, if we can set it up soon, why don't we just include him? And thank you very much.

The Child Survival Action Plan, at the request of Mr. McPherson, Administrator of A.I.D. will be retained in the committee files as well as the Plan for Supporting Natural Resources Management in sub-Saharan Africa, without objection.

[The documents referred to above, retained in committee files.]

Chairman LELAND. The committee will now hear from a three-person panel regarding the grave and worsening situation in the Southern Africa region, the political, economic, and military destabilization that is directly threatening the lives of several million people already.

Let me thank the witnesses in advance. We are joined today by the emergency coordinator for Africa at UNICEF, Mr. Vincent O'Reilly; also the director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Mr. Roger Winter; and Dr. Richard Carr, the senior official at World Vision International.

World Vision is one of several American private relief agencies attempting to meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Southern Africa.

I was particularly pleased at the accomplishments of World Vision during the African famine crisis and I witnessed their great work and really appreciate the participation here of Dr. Carr.

So please join us. We will ask Mr. Reilly to open for us.

Mr. Reilly.

STATEMENT OF VINCENT O'REILLY, EMERGENCY COORDINATOR, AFRICA, UNICEF, ACCOMPANIED BY SHAHIDA AZFAR

Mr. O'REILLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to present evidence on the situation of children and their families in Southern Africa. My name is Vincent O'Reilly. I'm the coordinator of emergency programs for UNICEF in all of Africa, and for the last 18 months was the UNICEF program officer to the Office of Emergency Operations, Africa.

Mr. Chairman, the report recently released by UNICEF entitled "Children on the Frontline: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa" describes a situ-

ation which up to now had hardly been reported upon and hence little appreciated.

Mr. Jim Grant, the UNICEF executive director, described the report as very discouraging. It documents the fact that infant mortality rates in the region, especially parts of Angola and now Mozambique, are the highest in the world, largely, although not exclusively, as a result of civil war and deliberate targeting of social services facilities as part of efforts to destabilize the economies of these two countries.

Last year an estimated 140,000 children in Mozambique and Angola died as a direct or indirect result of war and economic destabilization and this year is expected to be worse.

This is the equivalent, as our executive director has described, of a jumbo jet full of children crashing to the ground each day. The report states that of the estimated 1 million children born in those two countries in 1986, one out of two will be dead or crippled by the time they reach the age of 5. These terrifying facts are a consequence of underdevelopment compounded by war and destabilization.

To that end, Mr. Chairman, Children on the Frontlines notes that today in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, a child dies every 4 minutes as a result of preventable diseases, malnutrition, and war. Clearly, the tactics of combatants in the region are responsible for a large number of these deaths.

Angola and Mozambique have suffered the worst in terms of the direct consequence of war in the physical destruction of their social and economic infrastructure and ambushing of food and medical transport convoys.

In Mozambique, 40 percent of the schools have been destroyed since 1981 leaving some 300,000 primary school aged children without schooling and a total of 718 health posts and centers destroyed depriving over 2 million people of health care.

In areas of Southern Angola and much of rural Mozambique, the security situation has seriously affected vaccination programs, and distribution of food and essential supplies, resulting in rising malnutrition, and easily preventable and curable diseases taking a massive total of infants and children under 5.

While the direct and indirect costs of war and economic destabilization have been greatest for Mozambique and Angola, costs to other Southern African states have not been negligible.

The need to maintain abnormally high levels of security expenditures have adversely affected other countries in Southern Africa. The sabotage and destruction of shorter and cheaper trade routes have sharply increased the freight bills of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwean army patrols the Beira corridor through Mozambique to ensure safety of the transit shipment. Zimbabwe is estimated to be spending approximately $3 million a week to maintain the safety of its own and the regions' trade route through Mozambique.

Mr. Chairman, in drawing attention to the current situation of children in Angola and Mozambique, the report makes the point that given the priority accorded in post-independent periods in both of these countries to primary health care, and the success

achieved in the 1980's in reducing under 5 mortality rates to 260 and 270 respectively, the position in Angola and Mozambique should be comparable to that of Tanzania, a country at a similar level of development. Yet in Tanzania today the under 5 mortality rate is 185 per thousand, whereas in Angola and Mozambique by sharp contrast they have risen to 225 and 375 per thousand.

The difference between the statistics of Tanzania and Mozambique and Angola is indicative of the additional numbers of children who are dying as a result of war and destabilization in these two countries.

Thus, there were 55,000 excess deaths among under 5 children in Angola and approximately 85,000 under 5 deaths in Mozambique during 1986.

The 1986 death rate means that every 4 minutes an Angolan or Mozambican child who should have lived is dying, a situation which obviously calls for a serious and concerted action by the world community.

To this end, we have launched this report with a primary objective of trying to galvanize world attention and international community assistance. In our report we have identified urgent needs in health care, water, food production, school reconstruction, and basic education as well as more general support in reducing vulnerability and transporting aid supplies in Southern Africa.

It is however unfortunate to have to report that at a time of this increasing vulnerability, which is documented not only in UNICEF reports but other reports from the region, international donor response not only to UNICEF appeals but voluntary agency appeals and others, has been more than disappointing.

If I may, with regard to UNICEF, for example in 1986, for Angola, we appealed for some $26.6 million against which we have only received contributions of $3.5 million, or 13.17 percent of the total.

The same is unfortunately true of Mozambique where an appeal of $12 million has only thus far been funded to the level of 12 percent.

Overall UNICEF launched an African appeal in 1986 for $102 million for some 16 countries and thus far only 19.17 percent has been funded.

If I may with direct reference to the documentation of our emergency appeals, we are with our partners in the U.N. family and our friends and colleagues in the nongovernment organizations, constantly updating and prioritizing our appeals. Mr. Chairman, if it were useful, particularly for the countries which we are focusing on today, that is, Angola and Mozambique, we would like to share with you and the committee within the next week UNICEF's specific chapters on each of these countries which will document current humanitarian interventions and priority requirements.

Chairman LELAND. We urge your submission of these chapters to the committee and we will without objection leave the record open for the purpose of receipt of those documents.

[The documents referred to above appear at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. O'REILLY. Thank you, sir. If I may also in terms of the documentation of our appeals reconfirm that we are aware in our ap-

peals that we are dealing with a changed situation from that of 1983 and 1984. In some countries the best rains in a decade and the very generous billions of dollars of support provided in foreign assistance, as well as the heroic endeavors of the people themselves, have led to substantial improvements.

However, we must emphasize that unless this international assistance, even within the climate of civil strife and violence, for health care, seeds, food, oxen, and others, does not slacken off there is no doubt that there will be even greater additional suffering.

In recognizing this changing reality, the United Nations agencies at the field level have moved in some countries to a post-emergency phase while retaining some of the best working examples and successes of the temporary Office of Emergency Operations in Africa and its response program.

We have, for example, maintained at the field level the interagency task force which normally includes representatives of UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, WHO, and UNICEF. These groups continue to act as facilitators, consensus builders and information centers. They ensure and provide a guarantee to the donor community that the U.N. agencies continue to coordinate and facilitate assistance which is both pragmatic and flexible.

If I may also stress nongoverment organizations are equal partners in this effort at the field level.

At the headquarters level, the U.N. African Emergency Task Force continues to function as a key dimension of the new arrangements put into place following the closure by the Secretary General of the OEOA temporary office.

I'm also pleased to report that very recently UNICEF and WFP concluded an agreement for growth monitoring of children throughout Africa and that this organizational agreement forms a foundation of future information with regard to nutritional status of children which will be coordinated at field level.

If I may just quickly go back to the situation in Angola and Mozambique, there is no doubt that an increasing number of people have been displaced and have been forced to flee their farms seeking refuge.

In Angola it's unfortunate to report that the prospects to reactivate agricultural production, particularly in the central provinces, remain dim, thus leading to aggravated food deficiencies and malnutrition.

In this climate of increasing needs, the absence of an effective donor response to UNICEF's existing appeals has meant that we have not been able to expand our current supplementary feeding programs in Angola which meet the requirements of 200,000 children and which we estimate needs to be increased to cover 400,000. These expansions cannot be effected. We lack essential resources to transport food, purchase supplementary feeding, medical supplies, and others. Indeed as the committee is aware we have received very generous inkind contributions in the past for Angola of Public Law 480, title II food contributions and in 1987 we are again scheduled to receive a contribution of some 24,000 metric tons of food of which 12,000 is actually already being called forward.

However, complementary assistance is urgently needed. We need trucks, support for warehousing, training of maintenance crews, medical support, and others.

In addition, cash assistance is needed if we are to respond with the flexibility we need when access opportunities arise. There is no doubt that the current conflict makes this question of access difficult. However, we are cooperating with UNDRO, voluntary agencies and others in maintaining an airlift operation in Angola and Mozambique for the delivery of food commodities, medicines, and other nonfood assistance.

While I again emphasize that the successes of the overall African emergency and the saving of many thousands of lives could not have been possible without the incredibly generous response of governments and private individuals, allow me to note that last week, transiting from Ethiopia to London, I saw footage from the British Broadcasting Corporation which brought back the whole spectre of famine as it referred to Ethiopia in 1983. This footage was from Mozambique.

Mr. Chairman, we must respond quickly and we must respond with flexibility. As our executive director in our report has stated, the situation is very discouraging and infant mortality rates in the region in general but especially in Mozambique and Angola are now the highest in the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, my colleague beside me, Shahida Azfar is also a member of the UNICEF Africa section and both Shahida and I would be happy to try and answer any questions that you might like to put to us.

Chairman LELAND. Thank vou very much.

Would you like to make any comments at this time?

Ms. AZFAR. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LELAND. State your name again, please.

Ms. AZFAR. Shahida Azfar, and I am with the Africa section, responsible for coordinating programs in Southern Africa region. And one of the things that we have been trying to bring to the attention of the donor communities in general is the realization of the fact that the emergency in that region is of complex nature, and that we need to respond in a complex manner, which means that in addition to the drought-related emergency most of the world realized and responded to, the underlying cause of the emergency in Southern Africa is more than that. Most of us are aware of the causes. And hence the need has to be more than what we were doing in cases of drought-related.

In addition we have to understand the complex problem related to logistics of that region in which we have been trying to support the governments in carrying out relief and rehabilitation programs. And this is something that we wanted to underline and bring to your attention.

Chairman LELAND. Very good. Thank you. And now let us have Mr. Winter make his statement.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Azfar and Mr. O'Reilly appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 49.]

STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. WINTER. Yes. I am Roger Winter. I am the director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

I will try to avoid everything that has been said before.

The situation in Southern Africa with respect to refugees and displaced persons is a serious one. More than 10 percent of Angolans are displaced internally or have sought refuge in a contiguous country.

More than 11 percent of Mozambicans are similarly uprooted.

The impact for those two nations is equivalent to more than 26 million U.S. citizens being uprooted by violence. And, of course, neither of those countries has the resources this country would have to bring to bear if we were in a similar situation.

As a matter of fact, it now appears that there are proportionally far more uprooted Angolans and uprooted Mozambicans than there were uprooted Ethiopians when the tragedy of 1984 prevailed. While what we're talking about is a tremendously serious problem in terms of its dimensions, as my colleague indicated, it is one that has not been recognized by the media yet, most particularly, by the electronic media in this country.

Mr. Chairman, it is unclear what new resources the United States is prepared to bring to bear on the situation in Southern Africa, particularly with respect to Mozambique.

We commend the Ambassador, A.I.D., others who have had something to do with the initiative that has been launched for Mozambique and humanitarian efforts elsewhere in the region. However, these U.S. humanitarian initiatives must be adequately supported and not subject to what we might call funding glitches.

The appropriation which has been utilized to date to support relief in Mozambique was a drought appropriation that soon will be unavailable.

Resources to fund the Famine Early Warning System, which has been a very key system in the U.S. Government to create policy awareness of the situation, is running out at this time. And resources for nonfood needs that accompany this emergency—medical, health care, water supply, transport infrastrucures—have been chronically inadequate.

In short, Mr. Chairman, it really isn't clear yet that the administration is putting its money where its mouth is on this issue. The committee, we suggest, should request of the administration a real detailing out of its response to Southern Africa humanitarian emergency, particularly its new Mozambican initiative, to be sure that it will be adequately funded. Supplying food is critical, but supplying money is equally critical and money is far more flexible when it comes to bringing a response online.

Mr. Chairman, given that situation, we think that the bill you and some of your colleagues have submitted, H.R. 776, is tremendously important. The bill recognizes the current situation is already an acute emergency. It is. That's been clear this morning.

It also recognizes the inherent possibility that a greatly expanded humanitarian emergency in the region is at least possible.

But what is critically important in the bill is that it would provide a specific pool of money over and above other existing resources which can be used to respond directly to the humanitarian needs of the region. And I stress region, because we believe this is a regionwide humanitarian emergency. The situation needs to be approached on a regional basis, and we would encourage you—through your bill and other mechanisms—to promote increased emergency preparedness. We need to improve the capacity within the frontline states and other humanitarian oriented capacities, for example, international agencies, in the region, to both respond now, but also to bring online training, cross border mutual aid agreements and the other kinds of elements that can make a big difference if the humanitarian emergency expands.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 63.]

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much. I now would like to ask Dr. Carr to make his statement.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD CARR, M.D., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, WORLD VISION RELIEF ORGANIZATION

Dr. CARR. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for first of all calling these hearings and helping to highlight what we all within the U.S. Government and the international community and the PVO community see as a growing emergency.

I was going to save this until the last, but I want to just follow up, if I may, by way of introduction on what Vincent mentioned.

Our field people in Mozambique in particular, and as we have shared back with them in the last 2 weeks, are going through a deja vu. We are seeing now in Mozambique what we saw in Ethiopia in 1983 and 1984. And how we can highlight this, both for the American public and the international community, is something that we see as a very high priority.

And in behalf of the other PVO's, particularly those who are part of the international community, we will continue to work with your committee and other committees here in Congress to really impress that as a high priority.

Mr. Chairman, my written testimony is in the packet. I would, with your permission, just like to highlight a few very brief comments.

Chairman LELAND. The Chair would certainly appreciate that as a matter of fact, and your statement in full will be entered into the record.

Dr. CARR. Just to pick up on what the chairman and Mr. McPherson mentioned about the population in Mozambique. The U.S. A.I.D. mission reference of January 8, talked in terms of the 3.5 million people at risk, over 1.2 million have been displaced by the insurgent activity and another 1.1 million are affected by rural insecurity. There are 100,000 have been displaced by drought conditions, approximately 800,000 have been affected by the lingering effects of the drought, and 100,000 have been affected by the inability to maintain supply lines to where they actually live.

World Vision as well as other PVO's in the country are working in several provinces. We are working and have been since 1983 in Tete, Manica, Gaza, Maputo, and Zambizia.

One of our major concerns is in the Manica Province where 300,000 people live along the Beira Corridor; 200,000 of these are displaced. And even with the security that we have with the Zimbabwean government, along the Beira Corridor, we still have some major security problems as far as food deliveries are concerned, and what happens to the whole Beira Corridor initiative sponsored by the U.S. Government and the emphasis that may or may not be placed on that. We have some real concerns as far as food delivery in that region.

Just to highlight the growing involvement of the PVO's, in 1984, World Vision for instance delivered 5,000 metric tons of food. In 1985, we delivered 10,000 metric tons. In 1986, we delivered 15,000 and in 1987 we will deliver in excess of 32,000 tons of food.

I think this in itself, in addition to the other PVO's that are working in the region, indicates the growing need for food distribution. The February 23, FAO Early Warning Report I think helps summarize the need that unless further exceptional measures are taken by the international community over the next few weeks to deliver food to the critically inaccessible areas which we have a major concern about, widespread loss of life is inevitable.

The Mozambican government's recent estimate increased the number of affected population and included seriously affected people in some urban areas as well as the 1.2 million displaced persons. The government report, as we have received, further states that the people in particularly inaccessible areas already face possible starvation.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the FAO estimate of the 610,000 metric tons for the food aid deficit, that's 70,000 tons higher than we had the estimate last June, which is just over 7 months. That deficit of food aid need has been fully covered by donors, but we see within the PVO community the pressing need to expedite delivery and the internal distribution of the food aid to the most seriously affected populations, particularly in the next few weeks, because of the lean period before the next harvest.

Overall, both in field reports and needs assessments, within the region, particularly in Mozambique, I think the estimate is fairly safe to say that another poor harvest is almost certain.

As a result, the food supply position will remain extremely grave throughout 1987 and 1988 and food aid requirements will probably equal or exceed the 1986 and 1987 needs.

There are some bright spots, and I think we ought to at least talk about these in addition to the importance of food aid delivery, World Vision as well as other PVO's launched very successful AGPAK Programs in Ethiopia. Agricultural Input Packages, which are small packages of seeds, hand tools, and so forth.

World Vision started in Tete and Zambizia last year as a part of a major recovery initiative there and see that as hopefully the wave of the future for recovery programs. AGPAKs included seeds, fertilizer and so forth, and specifically we made sure that the recipients had at least 90 days of dry food rations to carry them

through their planting period and getting through until the next harvest.

As of December 31, we have helped 20,000 beneficiaries and we hope to double that program in 1987 and 1988.

Last major concern, just to follow up from what Roger said, Mr. Chairman, is that along with the needs of the displaced persons are the immediate needs of the Mozambican refugees who have re-entered Mozambique from Malawi. Where we are actually involved in helping out with these returnees, 7,000 returnees have been temporarily settled in Moatze near Tete city. The living conditions are deplorable. They are absolutely deplorable. Sanitation problems, water problems, potable water problems, soap, clothing, medicine, primary health care are not only critical, they are almost nonexistent. The returnees are having to bear extremely high daytime temperatures with little or no shelter and with limited food and water.

The internal crisis that Mr. Winter has already outlined has a direct impact on the stability of the whole region. Very briefly, Zambia has a refugee population in the bordering states, 40,000; South Africa, 20–30,000 plus; Malawi, 75,000; Zimbabwe, 30,000. World Vision, along with a number of other agencies, are working as well as we can in dealing with this.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I think we all understand that the crisis situation in Mozambique as it impacts internally and on the entire region of Southern Africa and the other frontline states could be a lot worse, while it still is critical, had the United States and other donors not provided food and the PVO's who pay a very major part had not been able to assist in distribution.

Right now we do not see food as the major issue. We see dollars. We desperately see dollars. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have been dealing with this concern of transportation money and management money and staffing money to the East Africa Drought and Famine Relief Program.

But distributing this food has meant the difference between life and death, and how we can translate this into improving health, nutrition, recovery programs, with the assistance of donated food, but as the highest priority with the dollars that we must have to be able to carry out the programs. Without the money, we cannot meet the needs that are there. So because of this, Mr. Chairman, we strongly support and commend you and your committee in the initiatives in H.R. 776 and the other legislation which attempts to provide increased assistance to the humanitarian relief and recovery in the countries of Southern Africa. And on behalf of not only World Vision but the Interaction people, we strongly support and will continue to support you.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much for such a definitive statement and thank all of you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carr appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 74.]

Chairman LELAND. I want to ask each of you one question apiece, because the time has grown late.

You have already said, Dr. Carr, about the need for more moneys. Can you just elaborate a little bit more on that? I know that you speak not only for World Vision, but also for the other PVO's, since the deteriorating conditions in Southern Africa are so

overwhelming. Can you just give us a little more specific information?

Dr. CARR. I think I can, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all the PVO's.

For example, in Mozambique, as we see the expanding crisis and the problems of security which impact on delivering food and setting up just very initial primary health care, particularly for children and older people.

We need to expand our own management capabilities. We need to bring in Portuguese speaking resource and staff folks. We need, the PVO's need to be both in the field. For instance, World Vision this year will open up management offices bringing agronomous and health people in Tete and Manica and Zambizia. That costs a lot of money. We have to have all the support facilities that go with that and the logistic support. That to me is at the top of the list for the PVO's to have the support of whoever can help us with raising that money, and all of the private voluntary agencies are experiencing down time in our donation. So we need the resources from whatever source we can get them.

Chairman LELAND. Very good.

Mr. Winter, the evidence you have presented today on the refugee situation in Southern Africa indicates that the region is facing a growing catastrophe.

What conditions are these huge populations of displaced persons facing exactly?

And could you give us some information on the state of the settlements for refugees and displaced persons in the region?

Mr. WINTER. Obviously the situation differs according to which refugee situation is being discussed.

One of the most unique refugee situations in the region is that of several hundred thousand Mozambicans who have fled the violence in Southern Mozambique and actually fled into South Africa. Perhaps that is a good measure of the desperation that some Mozambicans are experiencing. To get to South Africa is an incredible odessey. There are mine fields along the border between Mozambique and South Africa; the border is fenced by the South African authorities; a 16-mile portion of the fence is electrified with a regulatable charge that is sometimes set at lethal; and there are actual cases of people in flight from Mozambique as refugees who have been electrocuted.

Once they cross the fence, they are in the middle of the Kruger National Park, which is the region's premier game park. It is one place in the region where there are still very wild animals. And because people are not used to dealing with wild animals today like in the past, significant numbers, particularly young people have lost their lives trying to get through the park.

In August and September of 1985, South African authorities mobilized the South African Defense Force along that border for the specific purpose of keeping the Mozambican refugees out. It's worked rather well in some cases.

They have also mobilized other security units to keep the refugees out. Yet and still, people still try to come through. It is as I say a measure of the desperation on the other side. These are people who are related by kinship, by ethnic roots, on both sides of

the border and they grow up knowing that, if they go west, they will run into their kinsmen. The problem is that when they get to their kinsmen, there is no legal concept in South Africa of a black refugee. There is therefore no organized system of assistance for those people. And, in fact, if the South African authorities catch them en route to the so-called homeland of Gazankulu or another homeland, they capture the refugees and send them back across the border from which they already fled. It's a very desperate situation; it's a unique situation. We'd be very happy to supply you information on other refugee situations in the region.

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much. Mr. O'Reilly, can you give us some examples of the type of projects that UNICEF is currently funding in Southern Africa?

And if additional funding were made available, what projects would UNICEF be able to undertake in the region?

Either of you, or both could respond.

Ms. AZFAR. Mr. Chairman, as you know, UNICEF has its regular program in the country which is supplemented by funding requested of donors. These supplementary funds are noted by our executive board. In addition we have launched two emergency appeals in 1985 and 1986.

These emergency appeals basically relate to immediate relief and survival activities for which we need money for relief, blankets, tents, et cetera.

In addition to that, in Mozambique, realizing the complex nature of the situation and the response needed, UNICEF went into strengthening two types of activities. One was strengthening the government's capacity to be able to handle emergencies. The second was trying to strengthen the capacity of the people themselves to handle the emergency better.

For that what we did was to strengthen the capacity of the government departments at the central level which is responsible for the emergency, and to undertake relief measures by strengthening its logistics capacity. In that exercise, UNICEF was very fortunate to have the cooperation of CARE and funding was given to us also from U.S. A.I.D. to undertake logistics. A third aspect of that was airlifts to areas which were impossible to get through by road transport and for which the government carrier was used at a low cost to carry high value, low-volume supplies to the needy.

The second was strengthening road capacity by provision of trucks and trailers to make the journey from the provincial capitals to the districts and then to the people. We have also provided spare parts, fuel, and helped in the training of Mozambicans in maintenance operations so that they could carry out this operation with international donor support. Another aspect which UNICEF is trying to support is displaced people not only within Mozambique but those that have fled outside and who are now returning back whenever the situation improves.

Our response has been to support and develop their capacities by providing agriculture tools, seed, and fertilizer in order to plant food. This response targetted especially at women who have primarily been the agricultural producers in Africa. Water supply programs have been assisted as well as programs for immunization of children, including provision of oral rehydration salts so they

should not succumb to the diarrhea. These are some of the types of programs in emergencies.

In our regular programs we stress child survival activities which we could describe at a later time.

Chairman LELAND. Very good. Let me ask you. Mr. McPherson suggested that A.I.D. supports to some extent addressing the problems in Angola through UNICEF.

I presume it's appropriate for me to ask you if that support that we give to Angola through you is sufficient to meet the needs in Angola.

Mr. O'REILLY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, as I noted in my opening remarks we are this year receiving again a contribution of some 24,000 metric tons of U.S. A.I.D. food aid assistance. As you know, UNICEF is not normally the U.N. agency responsible for food aid programs, except those purely targeted at supplementary feeding for children. As to the total tonnage requirements that we can handle, yes, it is sufficient.

However, as I said, we need cash assistance, all of us, in terms of being able to respond with some flexibility in terms of purchase of trucks and other food carriers. We just don't have those resources available to us. We have constantly updated our emergency appeals and have brought attention to this urgent need for transport support.

I think the same is true for all of us, PVO's and the other international organizations currently operating emergency programs in Angola and Mozambique.

Chairman LELAND. Let me thank all of you, not only for your testimony but for the work that you do. It's most helpful to everybody. You save people's lives every day. And it's most helpful for us in the Congress to know that you're there, and especially in the crisis situations that we are operating under in Africa and more specifically in Southern Africa today.

I hope that we can come to some resolve about these problems. I hope that truly we can operate under the policy that, as the President, himself has stated, a hungry child knows no politics. I find that difficult sometimes to believe in terms of some of the policies that the United States carries out. But I hope that will become the case, the real case, with our policies toward Africa and other parts of the world.

This Member commits to you to do all that we can to assist you in your efforts, and I think the majority of the Members of this committee are very much committed to helping all of the people who suffer gravely not only from the problems of famine and malnutrition but the other problems that you have talked about.

So with that, let me just conclude the hearing and thank you once again.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the select committee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. I, too, would like to thank our invited guests this morning for coming before the Select Committee on Hunger to discuss some of the imperative needs in the conti-

nent of Africa. It is a privilege to hear from you, Mr. McPherson, as always, and I also look forward to the statements of each of our other guests.

I was in Africa just one year ago, and vividly recall the people and places I visited in Mali, Ghana, and Ivory Coast. Even though the worst ravages of the famine had passed, there were still a staggering number of desperately poor and malnourished families struggling to meet their needs for food, health care, shelter, and education. I believe the International Task Force of this committee can play an important role in our government's response to the needs of poor and hungry people, and hope that this morning's discussion will contribute to our ability to meet those needs.

This committee has worked long and hard to ensure that resources for child survival programs to combat needless sickness and death of the world's children are enhanced. We have worked to improve the effectiveness of our humanitarian food assistance programs, under both the Food for Peace Program and the Section 416 authority. This year, in addition to ongoing work in these areas, we will be giving special attention to support of basic education activities, and the provision of credit for small-scale enterprises in food production, marketing and other vital activities.

Again, thank you for coming before our committee this morning, and I look forward to your statements.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF M. PETER MCPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT [A.I.D.]

I am pleased to be here today to discuss several questions of interest with you, and to present to the Select Committee, A.I.D.'s proposed program for the Development Fund For Africa.

Although it is difficult to discuss separate pieces of our African strategy without involving all the components of the program, I know you have a special interest in the African food situation, the locus problem and our on-going locust control efforts, and the special programs being designed to assist nations of Southern Africa.

THE AFRICA FOOD SITUATION

Sub-Saharan Africa has been most fortunate for the past two years with regard to climatic conditions. Rainfall has been good throughout Africa, and with the exception of five nations, the general food supply situation appears adequate for the current crop yea. In fact, the nations identified as having exceptional needs by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) all have mitigating circumstances precluding adequate harvests. In Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia civil strife has affected food production. Botswana and Lesotho are areas with chronic food shortfalls, and even in good years, buy a major portion of their food needs from neighboring countries.

We have recently reviewed Sub-Saharan African harvest projections for the current crop year from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the FAO and the indications are that per capita food availabilities are at a level equal to food availabilities in the late 1970's. When one considers the rapid population growth of Sub-Saharan Africa and the devastation of recent drought years, it is a very positive situation.

This is not to say there are no longer pockets of hunger in Africa, but most of the current food problems in Sub-Sahara Africa are of a regional nature and are more closely related to market development, transportation infrastructure, and economic growth rather than overall indigenous availabilities.

Knowing that the good news regarding availabilities will not last indefinitely, A.I.D. has made a special effort to institutionalize a food production reporting system in our field missions throughout Africa. The results have been excellent, and we are getting complete and current information on food production, food imports and other donor food contributions. In addition, we have sought to capture special detailed information on food availabilities from eight drought prone nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Having current and reliable information will allow us to decrease our response time should another large-scale emergency situation occur in the future.

THE LOCUST SITUATION IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA

Perversely, climatic conditions favorable to sub-Saharan Africa agricultural production also favor the proliferation of locusts and grasshoppers which can generate plague-induced famine.

Traditionally, this situation is most severe following periods of prolonged drought. Thus, concomitant with the end of a three year drought in 1985, all five of the species of grasshoppers and locusts most devastating to agricultural production threatened to escape normal control measures in 1986.

Recognizing the implications of such a catastrophe, the U.S. worked with the FAO, other international organizations, other major donors, and the affected African countries to carry out an emergency control campaign in 1986. The U.S. provided almost $9 million to a highly successful international effort, costing about $38 million in total, to reduce potential crop losses. Some 3.8 million hectares of land, with a potential production value of over $80 million, were treated. Crop losses were held to less than 20 percent in the treated area, and the risk of production losses worth many more millions was eliminated in many other areas. Nevertheless, the 1986 emergency control campaign was late in starting, and the number of eggs that will hatch during 1987 is expected to be vastly greater.

Consequently, the U.S. has continued to work with the international donor community to plan a more organized program to deal with the locust/grasshopper problem over the next several years. Meetings have been held, planning undertaken, and agreements negotiated on how best to deal with the problem technically. Individual country plans developed in conjunction with the African nations and other donors have been undertaken, and resources have been put in place.

In addition, A.I.D. is developing a regional project to deal specifically with the threat of grasshoppers and locusts over the next three years. It will support an environmentally sensitive program that provides technical assistance, pesticides and other commodities, and training for African host country crop protection services. This project will support integrated pest management principles, including entomological and pesticide research, and the development of improved pest management and biological control mechanisms, at a cost to A.I.D. of about $15 million over three years. Roughly three times that amount is expected to be provided by cooperating countries and institutions.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN INITIATIVE

The countries of Southern Africa in varying degrees share many of the problems besetting all of sub-Saharan Africa: periodic drought, decreasing prices for primary products, and unmanageable external debt service burdens.

They also share the experience of a long colonial past, instances of unnatural dependency on South Africa, and an inability to maintain local institutions and infrastructure because of war, destabilization and political and economic uncertainty.

Their population is about 70 million, excluding South Africa and Namibia. Their total GDP is $22 billion, and their average per capita GDP is about $320 per year.

The Administration proposes a special initiative aimed at accelerating the economic development of southern Africa by helping the countries of that region to improve transport and expand trade and private investment in the region.

In the short-term, this U.S. initiative, whose interest areas are also shared and supported by a multi-donor community, will help southern African countries to:

Ensure that economic reform measures can be continued or enhanced; provide more efficient, cost effective transport routes for vital imports and exports; saved on import bills (through reduced transport costs and cheaper imports from the regional market), thereby making scarce foreign exchange available for other urgent needs; expand export markets; help maintain employment and income levels during a period of economic crisis.

This initiatived will also help set the stage for longer-term growth and development through programs to:

Realign regional trade patterns; develop productive local industries and promote competitive exports; embark on a new economic reform program; implement an equitable regional growth strategy to raise incomes and increase employment; restore the regional transport system to its former status—one that is efficient, reliable, well-managed and maintained, and of service to the majority of the region.

The United States has the opportunity now to expand its help to reinforce the fundamental decisions that countries of the region must make to promote further private sector led growth and expansion. The economic restructuring will in turn enable each country to attract new investment, expand trade and reverse the spiral of economic disasters.

The initiative will address the most acute constraint of the moment, the lack of foreign exchange to fuel increased production trade and investment. This will make it easier for countries to implement national economic policy reform programs, and

help the countries of the region through a period of economic transition which will inevitably impose hardships on consumers and producers.

Finally, U.S. assistance, combined with that of other donors, will help improve the physical intrastructure needed for efficient transportation of critical inputs and products for new and expanding markets.

THE DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA

The establishment of a Development Fund for Africa (DFA) is being sought in conjunction with the FY 1988 budget request for the Agency For International Development. The creation of the fund parallels Congressional suggestions included in legislation introduced last year by Senators Kennedy and Kasten and Representative Fascell.

Over the past years we have been rethinking and refining our development strategy for Africa based on a better understanding of the continent's crisis, our own experience with different assistance programs and modalities, and coordination with other donors and private and voluntary organizations (PVOs). As a result, we believe that our efforts to implement this program will be greatly enhanced by the enactment of the proposed DFA.

In addition to eliminating functional accounts, which will help increase management effectiveness, the DFA will provide long-term funding and signal a special U.S. commitment to assisting our African friends in their quest for a solution of Sub-Saharan Africa's unique development problems.

We will be able to continue agriculture, health, population, child survival, education and environmental activities while stressing private sector and policy reform efforts. The fact that we will be able to offer more flexible support to those countries which have made a significant commitment to developmental goals is another way to accelerate progress.

The major long-term objective of our assistance is to help African countries initiate and sustain economic growth that allows them to attain food self-reliance and equitable developmental progress. The major pieces of the strategy are economic stabilization and reform, agricultural and human resources development.

In recognition of the diversity of conditions in Africa, A.I.D.'s assistance programs are tailored to the specific needs of individual countries. In general, our programs support economic policy reforms to create incentives for growth and to enable African farmers as well as private businessmen to play a more dynamic role.

At the same time, our programs help develop the technologies, institutions and human capital required for productive employment and sustained growth. In order to maximize our impact on these developmental goals, we need to create and maintain the most effective financing instrument possible. The DFA will meet this requirement.

Our development strategy in Africa emphasizes increased agricultural production, expanded agricultural marketing activities, private sector development, as well as human resource development.

As part of the Development Fund for Africa we will continue the Africa Economic Policy Reform program (AEPRP) which makes substantial funding available for those nations pursuing agressive policy reform activities. Although much of our reform work is focused in the agricultural sector (e.g., agricultural pricing, subsidies, and private sector competition), it also includes other policy reforms (e.g., civil service refrom, trade and tariff reform, and increased foreign exchange availability).

As noted earlier, A.I.D. is also undertaking a major initiative in Southern Africa which will be a part of the Development Fund For Africa.

Our FY 1988 request is of $500 million to support the Development Fund for Africa. In addition, $100 million for Africa from the Economic Support Fund account will be requested to support strategic interests justified on political and security grounds.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

During the past two years, we have continually re-examined developmental efforts in Africa—from the standpoint of both the donor community and African recipients. We believe our recent program emphasis based on a mix of basic human needs programs and targeted policy reforms is appropriate. Our FY 1988 program calls for a continued mix of project and non-project assistance to complement host country efforts. It is important to ensure that sufficient resources are available to allow committed African nations to exercise greater control of their own destinies.

A key component for our development activities is the emphasis we are placing on women and their role in production, marketing, and investment. Understanding the

critical importance of women and how they influence development is a prerequisite for the success of our African strategy.

The Development Fund for Africa responds directly to the need for change as defined by the African community. This was outlined in May 1986 during the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa. The most notable aspect of the U.N. meeting was the unique degree of unanimity among African leaders with regard to their prognosis for the future and the developmental changes needed to produce positive African growth.

African development must be led by Africans. It must encompass massive economic and financial policy reform which fosters market-based development. It must seek to stabilize chaotic economic imbalances and reduce the burden of massive debt. And, most importantly, it must offer the potential for real growth that will keep investment capital on the continent and Africa's future leadership working at home.

AGRICULTURE AS THE PRIMARY DEVELOPMENTAL FOCUS

It has become increasingly clear that the improved management of Africa's natural resources, especially land, water and trees for fuelwood, must be an intergal part of our agricultural assistance efforts. The depletion of soils, deforestation, and poor land management are having a major long-term negative impact on Africa's agricultural future.

We are currently focusing on four major areas: agroforestry, soil and water conservation, fuelwood management, and energy. In Senegal, the $10.0 million Reforestation Project will mobilize local and private resources for treeplanting. The Ruhengeri Resources Analysis and Management project in Rwanda is working with local farmers to reduce soil erosion and improve watershed stability within an environmentally sensitive watershed.

In Sudan the $4.6 million Renewable Energy project has used a combination of U.S. dollar resources and local currency to promote both the production and conservation of fuelwood resources through local institutions and non-governmental organizations. The Africa Regional Energy Project continues to expend funds working directly with African governments to help demonstrate and disseminate self-sustaining public and private sector initiatives directed at deforestation, oil import dependence, inefficient energy use, and the retarded development of indigenous African energy resources.

In addition, we are sponsoring activities to learn more about trends and effects of changes in natural resource and energy availabilities and their impact on the quality of life for Africans.

Our regionally funded remote sensing activities and famine early warning efforts allow us to provide short-term assistance as well as indicate the programmatic focus for long-term solutions.

Our interest in the quality of life is not confined to the human experience. In the area of biological diversity, we have over 30 activities related directly to Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which in FY 1986 totaled about $2.5 million.

A.I.D. AND PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Of particular importance in making sure that we keep up-to-date on trends and conditions in Africa are A.I.D.'s relations with private and voluntary organizations working throughout the continent. Although the contribution of private and voluntary organizations is often confined to projects when one considers their relationship to A.I.D.'s program in Africa, of equal interest is the daily contact, information sharing, and feedback in the field, as well as seminars, and working groups here in the United States which they provide. Our recent cooperative efforts relating to the drought are clear examples of the effectiveness of this union.

We also believe that the kinds of reforms currently taking place in Africa frequently involve decentralization reaching down to the local level. PVO's, both U.S. and indigenous, are often ideally suited to foster this kind of change.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

A.I.D. has been a partner of long standing with African nations in their efforts to improve human resources and basic human needs in Africa. Although we place a major emphasis on policy reform and structural adjustment, the maintenance of a system that allows growth with equity is of critical importance to U.S. efforts in Africa.

One of the primary areas of concern in Africa is population growth. During the past several years, an increasing number of African nations have begun taking seri-

ous interest in population growth and its impact on the development process. Although we are planning bilateral development activities in 38 Sub-Saharan African countries, of particular interest is the proposed long-term regionally funded population project being considered for Nigeria. With a population in excess of 100 million people, Nigeria represents about one-quarter of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Of equal importance with population is the improvement of health care and effective child survival activities. We are currently exploring ways to expand health care provided through the private sector to ensure that services, once available, will continue to be affordable. An example of one such activity can be seen in Ghana where the manufacture and distribution of oral rehydration salts have been taken out of government and are now carried out in the private sector.

In addition, A.I.D. continues to work with several African nations and the Centers for Disease Control in establishing child survival programs. These programs include immunizations and the provision of oral rehydration salts, as well as maternal and child health and nutrition education. Since 1981, the regionally funded African Child Survival Initiative has been working in 13 countries and has immunized 8.3 million children against childhood diseases as well as two million women against tetanus. We are currently increasing support for major child survival programs in Kenya, Niger, Sudan and Nigeria.

In education, we continue to support primary, secondary and college-level training and institutinal support as well as vocational and non-formal educational efforts. A.I.D.'s participant training program has had a major impact on development in Africa.

We will continue to support participant training efforts through bilateral efforts and regional activities such as the Human Resource Development project. In addition, in the Sahel region, by emphasizing shorter term training in Francophone countries, we will be increasing the number of participants and hopefully be able to include more women.

In all of our human resource development activities, we are putting increasing emphasis on the private sector for the delivery of services. Given the high cost of supplying such services from public resources, and the limited tax base in most African nations, we believe that the only way for many services to be available on a continuing basis is through user fees.

CONCLUSION

I believe that we have reflected many of your concerns in our current program. It is a good strategy, and we believe it will yield sound developmental results.

I look forward to your questions.

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR M. PETER MCPHERSON

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MICKEY LELAND

Question. During the African famine of 2 years ago, we found that we needed substantially more funding for OFDA than was available through the regular appropriation. As the situation in Southern Africa worsens and, in the case of Mozambique, begins to take on the characteristics of a famine of great proportions, why has the administration not asked for more funding for Southern Africa? Is A.I.D. satisfied that all the funding required to meet the urgent human needs in the region is available? We are most concerned about a repeat of 1984 when this lack of funding was so costly to so many people.

Answer. A.I.D. recognizes that there are significant numbers of Mozambicans at severe risk as a result of the deterioration of the economic and social support systems due to the continuing insurgency and drought conditions. The situation is tragic and demanding of a generous response by the donor community including the U.S. Government. Since 1984, we have supported the Government of Mozambique in its relief efforts. Our experience has been a very positive one, marked by professionalism by the Mozambican government, involved international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The role of the NGO's continues to be an essential element of the humanitarian partnership and one we seek to continue with additional resources this year.

The administration, in response to the United Nations' appeal, announced on March 31 in Geneva the following plans for this year's U.S. emergency assistance to Mozambique's at-risk population: 150,000 MT of emergency food assistance.

In addition, 44,000 MT from other U.S. food programs will be sent to Mozambique this year giving total U.S. food shipments this year of 194,000 MT, all grants. This represents one-third of Mozambique's need. The amount will be shipped in its entirety by September 30, 1987.

The administration is also committed to providing sufficient funding for internal transport of commodities to those most in need. Toward this end we are providing the following funding to facilitate transport of our food aid pledge:

$1.2 million to support the internal transport and distribution of that food;

$1.5 million to CARE to support its ongoing logistics activities in Mozambique;

$264,000 to Air Serve to charter aircraft in monitoring relief operations; and finally

$3.4 million to UNICEF for the provision and delivery of vital medicines.

The administration is encouraged by the efforts being made by the Government of Mozambique in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others to address the question of establishing access to at-risk populations in difficult areas of the country. To underscore our support for ICRC the USG has pledged $500,000 toward ICRC programs which can serve those currently inaccessible. Success in these efforts is vital for humanitarian reasons as well as to stem the flow of those seeking refuge in neighboring states. However, for those who have had to leave Mozambique temporarily, the United States is continuing to give generously to United Nations' High Commission for Refugees regular budgets for Zimbabwe and Zambia, and to forthcoming appeals for the Mozambican refugee population in Malawi.

The administration hopes to meet current needs through available resources, but this may mean the use of borrowing authority under section 492(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act. This would mean obtaining resources for urgent human needs from regular development accounts.

Question. In 1984, 1985, and 1986, the United States met about one-half of the relief requirements for the African famine victims. Press reports and international organizations say abut 4 million are threatened in Mozambique alone. What is your estimate of the cost of our share of the relief effort in Mozambique and in the other nations in the region?

Answer. Our estimates of the fiscal year 1987 cost of the U.S. emergency relief effort in Mozambique, including inland transportation and support for PVO's, is as follows:

	Millions
Food aid:	
Title II emergency	$50.000
416/sugar quota	16.000
PVO support:	
CARE	2.700
WVRO	1.560
UNICEF	3.400
AirServe	.264
UNHCR	.250
ICRC	.500
Total	74.674

Two other emergency situations exist in the region the lingering drought in Botswana and the civil war in Angola. In Botswana, the United States is providing 20,440 MT of Public Law 480 title II grain with an estimated value including transportation cost of $7.143 million. To date the United States has no bilateral program in Angola, but is supporting a UNICEF feeding program in that country. The U.S. contribution to UNICEF emergency relief program in Angola is 12,400 MT of food grains with an estimated value of $5.359 million.

Question. While the United States has undertaken triangular trade agreements in Southern Africa in which the United States has, for example, provided Zimbabwe with grain in return for Zimbabwe providing Mozambique with some of their maize purchases, is it clear that we have not used such arrangements to their fullest potential. According to the FAO, the United States only provided 11,400 metric tons of food through triangular trade agreements in 1986, while the EEC provided 67,000 metric tons. Does A.I.D. intend to expand its efforts at triangular agreements, and if not, why not?

Answer. It is true that the United States provided approximately 11,400 metric tons of food aid under triangular agreements during fiscal year 1986. In earlier years, we arranged sizeable triangular arrangements involving Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. Halfway through fiscal year 1987, we have already authorized

triple the fiscal year 1986 amount. Generally, triangular arrangements of nonfood surplus countries consist of cash purchases of third country commodities, whereas U.S. triangular exchanges are made with Public Law 480 foods.

Currrently, the administration is considering the expansion, when and where appropriate, of the use of triangular agreements as well as other innovative uses of food assistance. Decisions on triangular arrangements will continue to be based on the recommendations of the members of the Development Coordinating Committee (DCC).

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAHIDA AZFAR AND VINCENT O'REILLY, UNICEF, NEW YORK

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the invitation to present evidence on the situation of children and their families in Southern Africa. My name is Shahida Azfar and I am currently serving as the coordinator of programmes in the Southern Africa region. With me today is Vincent O'Reilly, the coordinator of emergency programmes in all of Africa. We are pleased to be here today to present the findings of UNICEF's recently released report on the situation of children in Southern Africa. Vincent will review UNICEF's emergency programmes in the regions and we will be pleased to answer any questions you and members of the Committee may have.

Mr. Chairman, the report recently released by UNICEF entitled "Children on the Frontline: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa" describes a situation which up to now had hardly been reported upon and hence little appreciated. Jim Grant, the Executive Director of UNICEF, described the report as "very discouraging". It documents the fact that infant mortality rates in the region, especially parts of Angola and Mozambique are now the highest in the world largely, although not exclusively, as a result of civil war and deliberate targeting of social services facilities as part of efforts to destabilize the economies of those two countries.

Last year an estimated 140,000 children in Mozambique and Angola died as a direct or indirect result of war and economic destabilization and this year is expected to be worse. This is the equivalent of a Jumbo jet full of children crashing each day. The report states that of the estimated one million children born in those two countries in 1986 one out of two will be dead or crippled by the time they reach the age of five. These terrifying facts are a consequence of underdevelopment compounded by war and destabilization.

Two years ago UNICEF's 41 nation executive board instructed us to review the situation of children in especially difficult circumstances—children in war, street children, child prostitution and other forms of abuse. Last year the Board requested a review of the situation of children in Southern Africa with a view to determining the impact of political and military developments on the most vulnerable populations, women and children. This report fulfills UNICEF's mandate to document and report on the state of the world's children. I must underline this point that is it not our intention to probe the causes but to document the consequences of the world's actions on children.

To that end "Children on the Frontlines" notes that today in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique a child dies every four minutes as a reuslt of preventable diseases, malnutrition and war. Clearly the tactics of combatants in the region are responsible for a large number of these deaths.

Angola and Mozambique have suffered the worst in terms of the direct consequence of war in the physical destruction of their social economic infrastructure and ambushing of food and medical transport.

In Mozambique, 40 percent of the schools have been destroyed since 1981 leaving 300,000 primary school aged children without schooling and a total of 718 health posts and centres destroyed depriving over 2 million people of health care. In areas of Southern Angola and much of rural Mozambique, the security situation has seriously affected vaccination programmes and distribution of food and essential supplies resulting in rising malnutrition and easily preventable and curable diseases taking a massive total of infants and children under five.

While the direct and indirect costs of war and economic destabilization have been the greatest for Mozambique and Angola costs to other Southern African states have not been negligible. The need to maintain abnormally high levels of security expenditures have adversely affected other countries in Southern Africa, as well as the sabotage and destruction of shorter and cheaper trade routes, which have sharply increased the freight bills of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean army partrols the Beira corridor through Mozambique to

ensure safety of the transit shipment. Zimbabwe is estimated to be spending approximately $3 million a week to maintain the safety of its own and the regions' trade route through Mozambique.

Mr. Chairman, in drawing attention to the current situation of children in Angola and Mozambique, the report makes the point that given the priority accorded in post independence period in both these countries to primary health care, and the success achieved by 1980 in reducing under five mortality rate to 260 and 270 respectively, the position in Angola and Mozambique should be comparable to that of Tanzania—a country at similar level of development—yet in Tanzania today the under five mortality rate is 185 per thousand, whereas in Angola and Mozambique by sharp contrast has risen to an estimated 325/375 per thousand by 1985. The difference between the statistics of Tanzania and those of Angola and Mozambique is indicative of the additional numbers of children who are dying as a result of war and destabilization in these two countries. Thus there were 55,000 "excess" deaths among under five children in Angola and approximately 85,000 under fives in Mozambique during 1986. The 1986 death rate means that every four minutes an Angolan or Mozambican child who should have lived is dying—a situation which calls for serious and concerted action by the world community.

I would like now to ask my colleague Vincent O'Reilly to briefly review the emergency situation in this region.

The report further identifies action urgently needed in the areas of health, water, food production, school reconstruction and basic education; as well as more general support in reducing vulnerability and transporting aid supplies in Southern Africa.

It is, however, unfortunate that at a time of this increasing vulnerability documented in this UNICEF report, international donor response to emergency appeals has been disappointing.

For example, in 1986 for Angola UNICEF has appealed for some US$26.6 million against which we have only received contributions of US$3.5 million or 13.17 percent of the total.

In the case of Mozambique the situation is no better and our appeal of US$12 million has only thus far been funded to a level of some 13 percent.

In the overall UNICEF's Emergency African appeal of US$102 million for some 16 countries, has only been funded up to 19.17 percent.

With our partners not only within the UN family but also among our friends and colleagues in the Non-Governmental Organizations, we continue to update and prioritize our Appeals and if it were useful, particularly for the countries we are discussing today (i.e. Angola and Mozambique) we will, Mr. Chairman, within the next week forward specific chapters of UNICEF's emergency reports which document UNICEF's ongoing humanitarian interventions and priority requirements.

It is important to emphasize that in reconfirming our Emergency Appeal UNICEF is well aware that we are dealing with a changed situation from that of 1983/1984. In some countries, the best rains in a decade and the very generous billions of dollars which have been provided in foreign assistance as well as the heroic endeavours of the people themselves have resulted in substantial improvement. However, unless international assistance (even within the climate of civil strife and violence) for health aid, seeds, food, oxen, agricultural implements and others, does not slacken off there is no doubt that additional suffering will be a reality.

In recognization of this changing reality the United Nations agencies at the field level have moved into a new post-emergency phase while retaining some of the best working examples and succcess of the recent OEOA coordinated response programme.

We have, for example, maintained at the field level the interagency task forces which normally include representatives of UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNHCR, WHO and UNICEF. These groups continue to act as facilitators, consensus builders and information centres. They ensure and provide a guarantee to the donor community that the UN agencies continue to coordinate and facilitate assistance which is both pragmatic and flexible.

It is also important to stress that the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are equal partners in this effort.

At the Headquarters level, the UN African Emergency Task Force continues to function as a key dimension of the new arrangements put into place following the closure of the OEOA temporary office.

With specific regard to the situation in Mozambique and Angola there is no doubt that an increasing number of people have been displaced and it is currently estimated that in Mozambique alone more than half have been forced to flee their farms due to recent fighting. In Angola the prospects to reactivate agricultural production

particularly in the central provinces remain dim—thus leading to aggravated food deficiencies and malnutrition.

Unfortunately, however the absence of an effective donor response to our existing appeals has meant for UNICEF that the needed expansion of current ongoing supplementary feeding programmes for some 200,000 children cannot be effected. We lack essential resources to transport food, purchase supplementary feeding supplies, medical supplies and others. As the Committee is aware we have received very generous inkind food contributions from USAID and are scheduled in 1987 to again receive a repeat contribution of tons. However, complementary cash assistance is also urgently needed. We need trucks, support to warehousing, training of maintenance crews, etc.

In addition, cash assistance is needed if we are to be able to respond with flexibility when access opportunities arise. There is no doubt that the current conflict makes this question of access difficult however, we are cooperating with UNDRO and others in maintaining an airlift operation from Benguela to Huambo and Bie for the immediate distribution of food commodities, medicines and supplementary feeding components. These airlifts have been averaging three flights per day lifting some 300 to 340 metric tons.

While again emphasizing that the successes of the overall African Emergency and the saving of many thousands of lives would not have been possible without the incredibly generous response of Governments and private individuals, we must follow up on these successes and not slacken support. We may not today see on our TV screens images of thousands of dying and malnourished children; however as UNICEF's report and our Executive Director has stated, the current situation is very discouraging and infant mortality rates in the region (and especially parts of Angola and Mozambique) are now the highest in the world.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Shahida and I will be happy to answer your questions.

UNICEF Emergency Profile: ANGOLA

Total population	8.5 million
Population 0-15 years	3.6 million
Severely affected population	600,000
Percentage women and children of affected population	80 per cent
Infant Mortality Rate	150 per 1,000 live births

Following below-normal temperatures and adequate rainfall in late January and February the growing conditions for 1986 cereal crops and pastures have improved. However, earlier in the season the distribution of seeds, fertilizers and other farm inputs was hampered by logistical constraints and destabilizing actions. As a result, the area planted under crops was reduced and the cereal harvest in April-May is expected to be below average.

The combination of destabilizing actions and drought had seriously affected many areas of Angola in 1985, causing disruption of agricultural production, high percentages of malnutrition and high infant mortality rates particularly in the central and southern provinces.

The international relief effort provided cereals, supplementary feeding for malnourished children, basic drugs and relief survival items as well as water but the distribution of aid remains severely hindered by lack of transportation.

UNICEF, whose regular programmes in Angola total $8.1 million for 1985/86, so far has been able to provide emergency assistance worth $5.1 million received to date.

A further $26.7 million in supplementary funds is required to meet needs for UNICEF emergency and rehabilitation assistance, broken down as follows:

Health assistance	$4.0 million
Water supply	1.6
Relief and survival items	10.2
Supplementary feeding	1.5
Logistical support	9.4
Total	$26.7 million.

For further information, contact:
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 866 UN Plaza, N.Y., N.Y. 10017—Telephone (212) 415-8225


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9859F
April 1986

Situation

The outlook for the cereal crop to be harvested in April and May is unfavourable. Distribution of seeds, fertilizers and other farm inputs was hampered by logistical constraints during the planting season. As a result, the area under crops has been reduced.

Agricultural production has steadily declined during the last few years. The country's annual ceral production of 500,000 MT in the mid 70s has fallen to around 300,000 MT due to disruption of communications, lack of transport, lack of marketing structures and to the campaign of destabilization with external support in some of the most productive regions.

Cereal aid requirements for 1986/87 can be estimated at 218,000 MT.

Foreign currency earnings from major export co. modities, including coffee and diamonds and especially oil have decreased; and vital infrastructures and economic installations have been destroyed by acts of sabotage.

Children and women are the most vulnerable victims. Among the 600,000 severely affected people, 80 per cent are women and children.

In the central provinces about 25 - 30 per cent of the children are reported to suffer from severe malnutrition, often complicated by diarrhoea, measles or respiratory infections. The national infant mortality rate put at 150 per 1,000 live births has reached in some of the worst affected areas 200 per 1,000 or even higher.

Some 30 per cent of the children in an affected area such as Huambo province are severely malnourished. Out of every 40,000 severely affected children in Huambo, 3,000 are orphans or abandoned. Many women and children are disabled having lost limbs in mine explosions. Orphanages in affected provinces are overcrowded and need nutritional medical and educational assistance.

According to a survey in Luanda province, about half of all child deaths are caused by acute diarrhoea, measles, respiratory diseases, malaria or tetanus compounded by malnutrition. A survey three years ago showed that in the capital, children under five accounted for two-thirds of all deaths. In rural Benguela, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, most families have lost at least two children.

Nursing mothers and pregnant women also suffer alarmingly high morbidity and mortality rates. The cause is generally poor health status, complicated by high blood pressure, anaemia, bleeding, infections and frequent pregnancies

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UNICEF Response

From 1983 on, UNICEF emergency assistance has concentrated on supplementary feeding for severely malnourished children, health actions, essential water projects, additional logistical support, as well as relief and survival items.

For these actions, some $5.1 million, were received in supplementary funds from donors as well as contributions in kind.

UNICEF was able to provide some 16.000 MT of high protein food donated by the United States from December 1983 to date to cover the needs of 200,000 mothers and children. An additional 28,000 MT has been provided or pledged by USAID in 1986/87. In January, a shipment of 18 tons of stockfish donated by the Norwegian government arrived in Angola for distribution in Bie province.

From September 1984 to October 1985, 457 kits of basic drugs were supplied to health centres and posts of eleven central and southern provinces. Additional donations of basic drugs from Korea and from the UNICEF National Committee in the German Democratic Republic were provided to Luanda maternity and children hospitals.

The Children's Fund is now procuring on reimbursable basis for the Angolan government some 3,000 such kits valued at $2.2 million. Some 600,000 packets of oral rehydration salts have also been provided with a contribution from Greece. Equipment for primary health care is being provided for 21 health centres and posts while 18 jeeps, 4 trucks and warehouse equipment were provided with contributions from the Swiss UNICEF National Committee, Trinidad and Tobago and Japan.

With the help of an expected Italian contribution of $2 million to support universal child immunization by 1990, UNICEF will assist vaccination campaigns, combat diarrhoeal diseases and support nutrition activities over the next five years.

However, in order to meet still unmet urgent health needs of the affected population, a further $5,06 million in supplementary funds is needed. This will furnish health centres and posts with basic equipment and drugs. It will provide health personnel with accelerated training and fund transport and logistical support.

The lack of transport and logistical support is hampering relief efforts, particularly in those areas not adjacent to the main ports of Luanda, Lobito and Namibe. The inland transport of externally acquired food aid and relief and survival items still remains a crucial problem. Distribution within the municipalities is considerably impeded by the lack of transport, as well as by security constraints.

The national transport capacity for all supplies including food, drugs, seeds, fertilizers, etc. remains critically inadequate with a national shortage of 166 trucks. UNICEF has so far been able to procure some 63 trucks and has just received a donation of an additional nine from the French government.

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Due to the continuing migration of the rural population to urban centres, serious drinking water shortages have occurred. In some cities electrical power failures have paralyzed water pump stations. UNICEF is drilling boreholes, providing handpumps and rehabilitating damaged wells.

The UNICEF emergency assistance programme is extending and intensifying long-term development projects aimed at child and maternal welfare and improved water supply. To combat diarrhoeal disease and dehydration, Angola's major child-killer, UNICEF is seeking to provide oral rehydration salts (ORS) to all provincial hospitals, 80 health centres and 100 health posts. Some 1,500 village health care workers will be taught oral rehydration therapy, using ORS packets or similar mixtures based on locally available sugar or vegetable starch, and salt. The immunization programme will be expanded to vaccinate all children by 1990. Additional growth charts to monitor child nutritional status and drug kits will be supplied to health posts.

Special assistance is also being given to 32 orphanages serving over 4,000 orphans and abandoned children, along with support to women's educational programmes and day care centres operated by the Angolan Women's Organization.

By October last year, UNICEF had received some $5.1 million in supplementary funds.

In order to continue emergency and rehabilitation assistance in Angola, UNICEF is seeking additional supplementary funds totalling some $27 million in the areas of health, water supply, relief and survival items, supplementary feeding for malnourished children and logistical support.

UNICEF Emergency Profile:

MOZAMBIQUE

Total population	14 million
Population below 15 years	6.5 million
Population affected	2.15 million
Percentage of women and children affected	70 per cent
Percentage of affected population under 15 years of age (1.25 million)	58%
Infant mortality rate	159 per 1000 (1980)

SUMMARY

Civil strife and a bankrupt economy are the major causes of Mozambique's continuing food and health crisis. While "natural disasters" such as drought and flood have not hit the country so hard during 1985 and early 1986, chidren's basic needs of food, clothing, health care and shelter remain largely unmet.

UNICEF's regular programmes in Mozambique will total $14.7 million for 1985-1990. In addition, US$7,839,000 has already been secured for noted projects and a further US$6,250,000 is being sought for the same programming period.

Since the Africa Emergency Appeal in 1984, UNICEF has provided Mozambique with emergency assistance amounting to US$8.1 million, and an additional US$1.8 million worth of donations in kind.

Mozambique estimates a further US$17.4 million in emergency funds is required in 1986 to expand present support.

Water	USD 4,300,000
Logistics	3,850,000
Essential drugs and hospital supplies	800,000
Relief and survival items	3,000,000
Supplementary feeding	150,000
TOTAL	USD 12,100,000

For further information, contact:
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 866 UN Plaza, N.Y., N.Y. 10017—Telephone (212) 415-922


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7515F
April 1986

SITUATION

Bands of armed men associated with the rebel movement known as RENAMO continue to destabilize Mozambique. They attack peasants working in the fields, preventing them from planting or harvesting, and they ambush trucks carrying food supplies. This is a major factor contributing to the country's food crisis.

Zimbabwean troops are helping the Mozambican Army to guard the oil pipeline that runs from the port of Beira, in Mozambique, to Zimbabwe, and several important rebel strongholds were captured in joint military operations during 1985. RENAMO, which is supported by South Africa, has stepped up its destabilization campaign, and has even been able to win back some bases.

The economy remains very weak, and people in the countryside find hardly anything to buy with cash. This discourages peasants from producing and selling a surplus, another factor jeopardizing food security. Only 30 per cent of Mozambique's transport fleet was on the road in 1985, making marketing and distributing food, seed and agricultural supplies difficult.

On the whole, this season's rains have been plentiful, and those areas not affected by insurgency are expecting a reasonable harvest in April and May 1986. However, there have been some instances of flooding in Tete, and on the Inhambane coast, and drought continues in parts of Gaza, Inhambane and Manica, exacerbating the food crisis.

DISPLACED PEOPLE

RENAMO rebel attacks are forcing people to flee. No one knows how many have been displaced, as the number fluctuates. In early 1986, attacks were common in northern Manica, Tete, Sofala and Zambezia, with people taking to Mutarara, in southern Tete. The government Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) reported in January that 60,000 people had arrived in the Morrumbene area or the coast of Inhambane province from the hinterland. An increasing number are coming into the capital city, as RENAMO activity intensifies in Maputo province.

Others have crossed the border into one of six neighbouring countries, where they merge into the local population rather than declare themselves displaced. Exact numbers are not known, but 9,000 people fled from northern districts of Tete into Zambia in September 1985. An increasing number of people are entering Swaziland. While only 13,000 people are registered as displaced in Zimbabwe, it is estimated that there are some 80,000 Mozambicans living there unofficially. Similarly, only 12,000 are officially registered with the Red Cross (ICRC) in South Africa, but there may be up to 200,000 Mozambicans in the Republic. There is evidence that South Africa is repatriating Mozambicans at the rate of about 100 per day.

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Reaching this shifting population is one of the most difficult challenges the government and international aid agencies face. During 1985, some people returned from Zimbabwe to Mozambique, where rains fell and the security along the border improved. UNICEF supports a rehabilitation project for returnees in a border area of Manica province. So far, the 8,000 returnees have settled in eight villages and UNICEF is assisting with agricultural inputs, building materials, sanitation, small industries and health care. Some people who have been displaced from less secure areas of Manica are now joining the returnees. Another group needing assistance are those who have been captured by RENAMO, and then liberated by the army. They are often badly malnourished, and traumatized after months of living in the bush.

GETTING FOOD PRODUCTION GOING AGAIN

Food production is still declining in Mozambique; in 1983, the worst drought year, the country produced 73,000 metric tons of grain. In 1985, food production had dropped again to 59,000 despite the improved weather. This represents just 9% of the traditional cereal needs.

FAO estimates that the country will need to import commercially and through food aid 720,000 metric tons of grain between May 1st, 1986 and April 30th, 1987, with only 135,000 metric tons so far pledged.

Since 1983, the government has been trying to encourage small-scale food production, especially family farms, by providing commodities to exchange for food, as well as bringing in seeds, tools and other agricultural inputs. In some places, this has succeeded, for example, Inhambane, where DPCCN is distributing commodities to farmers on the outskirts of Inhambane City, who provide cassava and vegetables in exchange. The produce is then sold in the city.

However, security and transport problems have hampered the activities of AGRICOM, the parastatal body responsible for the commercialization of agriculture. AGRICOM's fleet of 190 trucks was reduced to 98, despite a donation of an additional 35 trucks by mid-year, because of rebel attacks, shortage of spare parts, and lack of maintenance and fuel.

An adequate supply of seeds has been pledged for the 1986/87 growing season, but 10 - 15 million hand tools (hoes, axes, scythes and machettes) are still needed.

HEALTH

Mozambique's infant mortality rate is officially estimated at 159 per 1,000 based on figures from the 1980 census, but it is much higher in places where security is bad and health services have collapsed. Health workers are often the targets of RENAMO attacks, and distributing medicines in the rural areas is therefore difficult.

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Children are no longer starving in Mozambique, but malnutrition is common. A survey carried out in four districts of Sofala in February 1986, revealed that 29% of children surveyed were stunted, and 7.4% wasted. A similar study in two peri-urban areas in Manica, showed that 32% of children were stunted, and 7.1% wasted.

The primary causes of child death in Mozambique are low birth weight, neo-natal tetanus, malnutrition, respiratory infections, measles, diarrhoea and malaria. Only 11% of children are thought to be immunized fully, and this has been a major factor leading to high infant mortality rates.

UNICEF RESPONSE

UNICEF, like most aid agencies in Mozambique, has tried to move from emergency relief into rehabilitation and long-term development during 1985. This has meant continuing some emergency interventions - such as providing fuel to Tete so that supplies can be distributed around the province - but also starting nutrition surveillance systems, integrated rural development projects, water supply and health programmes, and providing both training and technical support to various government departments and ministries. All projects are part of a general strategy to help families - especially subsistence farmers - guarantee their own food security.

In Manica, UNICEF has helped families returning from Zimbabwe to start a new life. Seeds and tools were provided; this year, the rains have come and the people are expecting a good harvest although this will not satisfy all their needs until next year. UNICEF provided draught animals, ploughs and livestock to improve agriculture, and carpentry and sewing equipment so people can earn a living. As more people move into the area, both from Zimbabwe and from other parts of Manica province, the government has asked UNICEF to extend assistance to additional villages.

In Tete, it has been more difficult to help people to get back on their feet again. The RENAMO bands twice attacked a UNICEF-supported project aimed at improving agricultural techniques, rebuilding the health services and setting up a system of nutrition surveillance. For this reason, it was impossible for technical support staff to live in or travel to the district where the project was located, and progress has been slow.

There has been more success in Inhambane - where UNICEF and Save the Children Fund helped local health services carry out an immunization drive. The aim was to immunize fully 70% of children under two years and women of child bearing: 69% of the target group were reached.

A similar immunization drive is now under way in Maputo City where the target is to immunize 90% of the children by the end of 1986. In southern Inhambane, UNICEF is providing technical staff and equipment for well-digging and rehabilitation. Three months after the project started, 21 wells have already been dug and handpumps installed.

Communication is a major problem in Mozambique - roads are rough, fuel is short, and often it is simply too dangerous to travel. UNICEF has provided AGRICOM with 20 two-way radios, to facilitate contact between different parts of the country. Training in radio maintenance is part of the project. UNICEF has also provided radios to DPCCN, so communication is possible between all provincial capitals in affected provinces, and some districts.

UNICEF is funding airlifts of emergency supplies, such as medicines, to remote parts of the country. USA for Africa has donated six trucks to Mozambique, and these are being channelled through UNICEF, which is also setting up a project to train personnel in transport maintenance in three provinces.

The UNICEF programme is directed to some of the underlying causes of the emergency situation and to long-term recovery of affected populations. It covers in 1986 mainly the areas of Accelerated Rural Development for Displaced/Affected People; Rural Water Supply and Logistics.

UNICEF is appealing for $12.1 million to continue emergency and rehabilitation assistance to women and children in need.

UNICEF is also seeking continued funding through 1987 and 1988 for projects already ongoing in 1986, directed at long-term recovery:

Rehabilitation of displaced population in Manica	USD 500,000	(1987/8)
Rehabilitation of drought/war affected population in Tete	500,000	(1987/8)
Logistics Support Programme	600,000	(1987)
Radio Communication Network	300,000	(1987)
Emergency Information System	300,000	(1987)
Water and Sanitation	2,000,000	(1987)
Administration and Programme Support	500,000	(1987)
TOTAL	USD4,700,000	

Prepared Statement of Roger Winter, Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Long a disaster area in human rights terms, southern Africa is now an area of intense humanitarian crisis and has the potential for becoming the location of a region-wide humanitarian emergency of biblical proportions. Every day we follow the unfolding drama inside the Republic of South Africa, which is, in turn, involved in conflicts in neighboring states. There is no question that efforts to redress the imbalance of power in South Africa are of the highest priority, as must be efforts to assist apartheid's victims there. However, there are other conflict-caused humanitarian tragedies in the region involving massive numbers of refugees and internally displaced people; these victims and their needs are the primary subject of this testimony.

As 1986 closed, there were nearly 900,000 refugees and close to 7 million persons internally displaced throughout southern Africa. The number of internally displaced inside South Africa--displaced through violence and as a consequence of apartheid policy--approaches 4 million, or 20% of the black population. Elsewhere within the region there are an additional 2.7 million persons displaced by civil conflict. While Ethiopia continues to be the continent's primary producer of refugees, Angola and Mozambique are second and third, respectively. More than 10% of Angolans are displaced internally or have sought refuge in a contiguous country. Nearly 11% of Mozambicans are uprooted. The impact for those two nations is equivalent to more than 26,000,000 U.S. citizens being uprooted by violence. And, of course, neither Angola nor Mozambique nor their neighbors have nearly our resources to cope

Southern Africa 1986*

= 10,000 refugees
= 10,000 internally displaced
*As of December 1986

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

with this problem. Although one cannot speak with total precision on numbers when discussing internally displaced populations, it appears there are now proportionately far more uprooted Angolans and uprooted Mozambicans than there were uprooted Ethiopians during the tragedy of 1984. Their numbers are rising and their conditions are tragic. Recently, UNICEF estimated that 140,000 children under five in Angola and Mozambique died during 1986 as a consequence of war and destabilization. Every four minutes a child under five dies as a consequence of violence in these two countries. This is an unnatural disaster.

Uprooted Mozambicans are the subject of a report issued by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in November entitled Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum. We are now working on a similar report on uprooted Angolans, to be followed by a report on refugees from South Africa and Namibia.

Let us focus on uprooted Mozambicans. Of Mozambique's population of 14 million, nearly 1.5 million are uprooted internally or have taken refuge in neighboring countries. However, over 3 million more are seriously affected by the violence which has ravaged the countryside and by the after effects of drought. "Seriously affected" implies they remain in their villages but are essentially cut off from adequate supply channels and are, in many cases, desperate.

Violence against civilians in Mozambique has been particularly gruesome. After Mozambique became independent in 1975, first Rhodesia and then South Africa supported the insurgents of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) against the governing FRELIMO party which had assumed power from the Portuguese. By the early 1980s violence was widespread and atrocities against

Uprooted Populations of Southern Africa 1981–1986

COUNTRY	INTERNALLY DISPLACED		IN EXTERNAL REFUGE		TOTAL UPROOTED	
	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86
Angola	30,000	480,000	197,200	376,000	227,200	856,000
Mozambique	—	1,100,000	—	348,800	—	1,448,800
Namibia	20,000	50,000	41,700	78,000	61,700	128,000
So. Africa*	—	100,000	24,300	34,650	24,300	134,650
Zambia	—	—	2,500	1,800	2,500	1,800
Zimbabwe	30,000	20,000	30,000	4,200	60,000	24,200
Totals	80,000	1,750,000	295,700	843,450	375,700	2,593,450

Equals 537% increase 12/81–12/86

*Figures for South Africa do not include an estimated 3,500,000 persons forcibly relocated since 1981 under the South African government's "homelands" policies.

civilians were commonplace, most often attributed to RENAMO's forces but occasionally also to FRELIMO. Often refugees we have interviewed are unable to identify who perpetrated the violence against them.

Because of the escalating violence, large numbers of Mozambicans have made the difficult choice to abandon their homes and seek asylum in neighboring countries. As the chart and map which accompany this testimony indicate, many have gone to Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1986 many also went to Malawi, with a major influx occurring last fall. Malawi at first obfuscated the presence of refugees within its borders until their numbers became seriously burdensome. Finally, two months ago, Malawi, which had been forcibly repatriating some groups of Mozambicans, decided to allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to establish a presence there to help meet the refugees' needs.

Perhaps the presence of Mozambicans in South Africa--the largest presence in any contiguous country--is the most anomalous. Aside from Mozambicans present in South Africa for employment purposes, many have entered in flight from the violence in Mozambique. Many had been successful small farmers, whose loss has further compounded Mozambique's woes. They enter South Africa seeking refuge with ethnic kinsmen who reside in several of the so-called "homelands", particularly Gazankulu.

Their flight is dramatic and most do not reach secure asylum. Inside Mozambique they must avoid armed forces of either side; both FRELIMO and RENAMO are proven to harm or at least stop those seeking to leave. They must also avoid mines along the Mozambican side of the border placed by FRELIMO to deter "desertion". At the border they encounter a fence network erected by the South African authorities including some 16 miles of fence electrified

with a regulatable charge that is at times set at lethal. There are a number of confirmed cases of would-be refugees being electrocuted. If they get past the fence, they are in South Africa, specifically the Kruger National Park, the region's premier game park. Many young people, not used to dealing with wild animals, have died trying to cross the Park. In late summer 1985, the South African Defense Force was mobilized to stem the entry of refugees; other security forces, including park rangers, have been similarly mobilized. If these forces encounter the asylum seekers anywhere outside of or enroute to Gazankulu or another homeland, they arrest them and force them back to Mozambique. If they reach their kinsmen in Gazankulu, they are generally safe.

While such refugees are in de facto asylum, they have no legal protection, nor do they benefit from an official system of assistance. The primary caregivers to the refugees are their poverty-stricken kinsmen. Church groups and voluntary agencies assist but, given the realities of life in a South African homeland, services both for the South Africans there and for the refugees are exceedingly limited. In some instances, medical and other assistance is provided locally by the authorities.

As harsh and uncertain as the lives of Mozambican refugees are, it is generally the case that internally displaced Mozambicans are even worse off. Forced to abandon their homes and farms, most are now wholly dependent for their survival on food rations donated primarily by Western nations and distributed through government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production and total food requirements greatly exceeds the amount of food donated, however, and constant interdiction of supply routes by RENAMO has severely curtailed distribution. Malnutrition and its related

diseases are common, and famine threatens large areas of the country. Most severely affected are the areas immediately north and south of the Zambesi River--the provinces of Zambesi, Sofala, and Tete--and the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane north of Maputo. On January 8, the U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique declared a food emergency in Mozambique noting that "the disruption of social and economic life (mainly food production activities and transportation infrastructure) by civil strife has reached disaster proportions. The magnitude of the impacted populations, the geographic dispersion of affected areas, and the diminished capacity of the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique to provide relief from its own resources require immediate and sustained assistance from the United States."

We agree and commend the Ambassador, AID, and the Bureau for Refugee Programs for their initiative in responding to both Mozambican refugees and internally displaced Mozambicans. In particular we commend the Administration for its recent new initiative on aid for Mozambique and call for the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a high level disaster-relief coordinator for that devastated country--although we believe it is approaching the time to consider the designation of a lead responsibility to oversee the planning of humanitarian assistance for the entire region. We encourage the U.S. authorities to be especially bold in assisting the little victims of the region's strife--children, peasants and other innocents. These U.S. humanitarian initiatives must be adequately supported and not subject to funding "glitches". Yet the appropriation which has been utilized to support relief in Mozambique will soon run out, as will funding for the very important Famine Early Warning System. And resources to meet nonfood needs such as

medical care, water supply and transport infrastructure have been chronically inadequate. In short it is not yet clear the Administration is putting its money where its mouth is. The Committee should request of the Administration a detailed report on how its response to the southern Africa emergency, particularly its new Mozambique initiative, will be adequately funded. Supplying food is critical--but so is supplying money, with its inherent flexibility.

Across the continent in Angola, the situation of the civilian population mirrors that in Mozambique. Armed conflict between government and insurgent forces of UNITA has forced some 376,000 Angolans to seek refuge in neighboring countries and has uprooted another 480,000 within Angola. Destruction of the logistical infrastructure and interdiction of supply routes have resulted in serious food shortages among the displaced populations. On the Central Plateau, where most of those displaced are located, malnutrition is widespread and infant and maternal mortality rates are high. Outside Angola, the presence of large numbers of Angolan refugees has heightened tension between Angola and its neighbors and has complicated the domestic political situations in the countries of asylum.

Turning to the matter of South African refugees, it is of course remarkable, given the level of violence within South Africa, that the numbers of blacks, whites, and others who have left the country and become refugees or are in refugee-like circumstances are comparatively small. Still, the South African authorities have gone to great lengths to blur the picture and equate "refugee" with "guerrilla". This is of course untenable. It appears to be a tactic to intimidate front line states and justify military attacks against refugees such as those that occurred in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe last

year. Refugees also figured prominently in South Africa's pressure on Lesotho in January 1986, which resulted in the deposing of that country's government.

It is of great humanitarian importance that the need to improve the capacity throughout the region for dealing with a dramatically increased humanitarian emergency be adequately addressed. International organizations and others need to think through assistance mechanisms on a region-wide basis and foster the structuring of mutual aid systems across borders and other mechanisms for coordination and communication. UNHCR has set up a southern Africa working group, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is taking steps to improve the capacity of Red Cross societies in front line states to respond to humanitarian emergencies. InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies have structured working groups to analyze and improve the role of international and national nongovernmental agencies to respond to humanitarian emergencies in the region.

In this context, the enactment of H.R. 776 is vital. The bill recognizes the current situation is already an acute humanitarian emergency and responds to it. It also recognizes the inherent possibility that a greatly expanded humanitarian emergency in the region is--at minimum--possible. But what is critically important is this legislation will provide a specific pool of money over and above other existing resources which, particularly with limited amendments, can be used to respond directly to the emergency humanitarian needs of the region.

The U.S. can foster the needed analysis and contingency planning with positive leadership, diplomatic encouragement, and resources. No rational

person wishes to see the region further enveloped in violence, with its attendant devastation of civilians. But virtually everyone familiar with the dynamics of the region will acknowledge that the "worst case scenario" there, while horrible to contemplate, is distinctly possible. In this case, none of us with roles to play in a humanitarian emergency can claim we did not have adequate warning.

The armed conflicts that pervade southern Africa reflect a web of political and economic relationships which bind together all the nations in the region. The civil wars, the hunger, the displaced and refugee populations--even apartheid, itself--are regional problems requiring regional solutions. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to indicate that peaceful solutions are viable. Thus, the regional conflicts will almost certainly intensify in the future. Justice is the prerequisite for peace in the region and we pray both will ultimately prevail. In the meantime, saving the lives and futures of today's victims and tomorrow's victims must become a clearer priority.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
1981-1986

ASYLUM COUNTRY	REFUGEES				DISPLACED PERSONS		TOTAL PERSONS UPROOTED	
	Source Country	1981	Source Country	1986	1981	1986	1981	1986
ANGOLA	Namibia 35,900 S. Africa 6,000 Zaire 18,000	59,900	Namibia 70,000 S. Africa 9,000 Zaire 13,200	92,200	30,000	480,000	89,900	572,200
BOTSWANA	Angola 200 Namibia 300 S. Africa 500	1,000	Angola 200 Namibia 150 S. Africa 500 Zimbabwe 4,200	5,050			1,000	5,050
LESOTHO		2,000		2,500			2,000	2,500
MALAWI			M'bique 70,000	70,000				70,000
MOZAMBIQUE	S. Africa 1,000 Zimbabwe 30,000 Others 1,000	32,000	S. Africa 100 Various 300	400		1,100,000	32,000	1,100,400
NAMIBIA	Angola 40,000	40,000	Angola 40,000*		20,000	50,000	60,000	50,000
S. AFRICA			M'bique 175,000	175,000	**	100,000**		275,000
SWAZILAND	S. Africa 6,500	6,500	S. Africa 7,000 M'bique 4,800	11,800			6,500	11,800
ZAIRE	Angola 139,000 Zambia 1,800	140,800	Angola 290,000	290,000			140,800	290,000
ZAMBIA	Angola 18,000 Namibia 5,500 S. Africa 1,800 Zaire 5,000 Others 200	30,500	Angola 86,000 M'bique 33,000 Namibia 7,000 S. Africa 3,000 Zaire 9,500 Others 2,500	141,000			30,500	141,000
ZIMBABWE			M'bique 66,000 S. Africa 500	66,500	30,000	30,000	30,000	96,500

U. S. Committee for Refugees, January 1987

*Angolans in Namibia have been granted permanent resident status and, thus, are no longer refugees in need of international protection or assistance.

**Approximately 3.5 million persons who have been forcibly dislocated and resettled in "homelands" in South Africa have not been included in this table, but are certainly "displaced".

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CARR, M.D., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, WORLD VISION RELIEF ORGANIZATION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the House Select Committee on Hunger, and other Members of Congress in attendance. My name is Richard Carr, and I am here representing the president of World Vision. We are an international Christian humanitarian agency serving in 80 countries worldwide, including 24 African nations. I appreciate the opportunity to share with this Committee program information and concerns of our organization regarding relief and development needs in southern Africa generally, and Mozambique specifically.

World Vision has maintained ongoing relief and development programs throughout the southern Africa region for several decades. Our programs include child sponsorship/child care projects, small business/income generating activities, and integrated community development programs (including agriculture, water, primary health, nutrition, education, vocational training, environment recovery, etc.)

Much of World Vision's current relief and rehabilitation initiatives in southern Africa are targeted for Mozambique. In 1986 Mozambique's population was listed as 14.1 million. More than one third of the entire country's population, or 5.5 million people, are listed as adversely affected by current food shortages. People listed as "at risk" are 3.5 million, or more than one fifth of the entire country. (These figures are estimates made by the USAID Mission in Maputo on January 8, 1987.) Of the 3.5 million people at risk, 1.2 million have been displaced by insurgent activity, 1.1 million others have been affected by rural insecurity, 100,000 have been displaced by drought conditions, approximately 800,000 have been affected by the lingering effects of drought, and 100,000 have been affected by the inability to maintain supply lines. Of the 3.5 million people at risk, USAID Maputo estimates that only 1.3 million are in accessible areas. The remaining 2.2 million must rely on shipments via sea, air or heavily secured military convoys. Refugee populations are of equal concern as they relate to the Mozambican crisis.

World Vision is working in five provinces of Mozambique, including Tete, Manica, Gaza, Maputo and Zambezia. We estimate the total beneficiaries of our programs to be approximately 245,000. In the Tete Province, Tete City is the only Mozambican crossing point of the Zambezi River. The main road (from border to border) operates under escort of the Zimbabwean army convoy. All territory to the north of the river is subject to insurgent activity. The territory south of the river is relatively free of insurgency, as it seems to fall under Zimbabwe's sphere of influence. This southern region is still recovering from an ongoing drought of three years, including after effects such as locust infestation, lack of seeds and a largely migrated population. In addition, communal villages have upset the traditional family based production.

Of the estimated 500,000 people living in the Manica Province, 300,000 are living along the Beira Corridor; 200,000 of these are displaced. The 200,000 people living in the outlaying areas have little or no access to supplies. The most critical need in this province is for clothing.

In the past year, insurgents have harassed virtually the whole province of Zambezia, up to the highlands near Malawi and the railroad which runs west from the Port of Nakala. Laubo, in the southern region of Zambezia, was overtaken and has remained in insurgent hands since that time. The emergency/security situation has grown proportionally as the insurgent numbers have increased. Government attempts to liberate Micaune and Luabo have failed, undermining the already poor morale, training and equipment of local forces. Border areas are experiencing increased hardship and hunger, and field reports indicate a continuing need for even basic necessities of survival.

In response to the continuing food shortage throughout Mozambique World Vision is providing, during fiscal year 1987, in excess of 31,000 MT of dry ration food resources. This consists of 25,000 MT of maize, 3,000 MT of beans and 3,000 MT of vegetable oil. Because of the fluctuating population, it is difficult to provide accurate beneficiary figures; however the recipients include displaced people as well as comparatively stable community populations.

In the provinces of Zambezia, Gaza and Maputo, World Vision is providing 11,000 MT food to approximately 100,000 beneficiaries. World Vision partner agencies in these three provinces are the Mozambican Department for Combat and Prevention of Natural Calamities (DPCCN), Mozambique Red Cross, Caritas and Christian Council of Mozambique.

World Vision has been in Tete Province since 1983-84. In 1984 5,000 MT of Dutch Maize was distributed in the province. The following year World Vision distributed an additional 10,000 MT of USAID commodities with the program expanding in 1986 to provide 13,000 MT of USAID and 2,000 MT of Australian commodities. In

1987 World Vision will provide 15,000 MT of USAID, 4,500 MT of Canadian, 6,000 MT of EEC and 5,000 MT of Australian commodities in our regular food programs. Beneficiaries will number more than 100,000. Due to continued displacement of people in Tete, beneficiaries have been increasing, and the World Vision management infrastructure, developed in cooperation with the DPCCN, has been strengthened.

World Vision is providing 6,500 MT of food to approximately 45,000 beneficiaries in Manica Province. Our partner agency there is the Mozambique Red Cross. Emergency food distribution will continue in Gaza Province and will increase following program needs assessments due World Vision's Maputo office no later than 1 March 1987.

World Vision, as well as other NGOs operating in Mozambique, agree that the food situation in the country will continue to deteriorate. A very recent FAO Early Warning report states that unless further exceptional measures are taken by the international community over the next few weeks to deliver food to critical inaccessible areas, widespread loss of life is inevitable. The Mozambican government's recent estimate increased the number of affected population, and included seriously effected people in some urban areas, as well as 1.2 million displaced persons. The government report further states that people in particularly inaccessible areas face possible starvation. Immediate requirements to meet the food aid deficits has been estimated by FAO to be 610,000 tons, 70,000 tons higher then the previous estimate of June 1986. In addition supplementary food, blankets, clothing, and farming implements are urgently needed. At this point, donor pledges will fully cover the estimated food aid needs of 610,000 tons in 1986/1987. However, there is pressing need to expedite delivery and internal distribution of food aid to the most seriously affected populations in the lean period before the next harvest.

Estimates of food harvests for 1987/1988 are unfavorable mainly due to civil turmoil. In all provinces the amount of planting has been seriously reduced by strife and input shortages. Overall, another poor harvest is certain. As a result, the food supply position will remain extremely grave throughout 1987/1988 and food aid requirements will equal or exceed 1986/1987 needs.

One of World Vision's most successful programs in Ethiopia, during the crisis situation in that country, was the distribution of agricultural input packages (AGPAKS). AGPAKS are now being distributed to farmers in Tete and Zambezia Provinces as part of a major recovery initiative there. The AGPAKS include appropriate seeds, agricultural handtools, nutritionally balanced dry rations for three months, and fertilizer. In addition an agronomist is providing instructions in enhanced agricultural techniques. Beneficiaries total 10,000 in Tete and 8,000 in Zambezia. We hope to expand this program in 1987.

Another major concern of World Vision, along with the needs of the displaced persons, are the immediate needs of the Mozambican refugees who have re-entered Mozambique from Malawi. Approximately 7,000 returnees have been temporarily settled in Moatze, near Tete city. Living conditions are deplorable, and the needs for potable water, soap, clothing, medicine and primary health care are critical. The returnees are having to bear extremely high daytime temperatures with little or no shelter and limited food and water.

Mozambique's internal crisis also has a direct impact on the stability of the entire region. Refugee populations in bordering states are currently estimated at: Zambia—40,000; South Africa—20-30,000; Malawi—75,000; Zimbabwe—approx. 30,000. World Vision is responding to the needs of the refugee populations in these countries as well. Our overall objective, however, is to enable refugees to return to their country in as stable a situation as possible, which will directly benefit the region as a whole.

The crisis situation in Mozambique, while critical, would be much worse if the U.S. and other donors had not provided food, and if PVOs had not been able to assist in distribution. It has literally meant the difference between life and death. Continuing needs are for financial resources with which to ensure the distribution of donated food. Due to our involvement in Mozambique and other countries in southern Africa we realize the urgency of the need for increased support to this region. World Vision is committed to meeting the needs not only in Mozambique, but in the entire region and to work towards further stability in these countries. World Vision therefore strongly supports the initiatives in H.R. 776, and other legislation which attempts to provide increased assistance for humanitarian relief and recovery in the countries of southern Africa. Thank you.

SOURCES

FAO Early Warning Systems Report, February 24, 1987.
USAID Maputo Mission, January 8, 1987.